Now the Coast Guard need not be blamed about having cleared the MV Blue Water when it sailed overloaded on the evening of Wednesday from the Port of Lucena. It is no longer the Coast Guard’s job to conduct pre-departure clearances. The Maritime Industry Authority has since taken the responsibility of clearing ship seaworthiness when in a circular it authorized a sworn master’s oath of safe departure to suffice in lieu of pre-departure clearances.
In the aftermath of the MV Blue Water tragedy that left at least a dozen dead, the Coast Guard said that it will convene a Board of Marine Inquiry to determine the cause of the accident, hold culprits responsible and indemnify victims. Question is, will the Coast Guard recommend Marina axed if the inquiry can establish the authority committed lapses?
In a span of less than 24 hours, two maritime accidents happened this week. The MV Super Shuttle Ferry 10 was stalled at mid-sea off the coasts of Surigao after its engines malfunctioned in the morning of Wednesday. No one was hurt and all passengers and crew were rescued in the Surigao mishap. But at 3 a.m. of Thursday, the 400-ton MV Blue Water ran aground then fell on its side as it was hit with big waves while underway to Masbate. At least a dozen bodies have been recovered, while hundreds are missing.
Coast Guard Quezon station commander Eli Tumulac said the ship’s manifest listed only 28 passengers and 21 crew. But as of Thursday, close to 130 were rescued and at least 13 bodies were found. MV Blue Water shipmaster said there were 256 passengers and 14 vehicles on board.
What is common about the Surigao and Quezon accidents is that engines were the problem. In fact, engine failure is almost always the problem. Whether it is the MV Solar I that sank off Guimaras Island last year spilling millions of tons of bunker fuel, to the Butuan Bay explosion in June or the stalled Princess of the Ocean this month, the problem has always been with engines.
Each time there is a maritime accident or mishap, Marina safety and enforcement officers and shipowners easily blame engine trouble. It is by this pattern of events that casts aspersion on whether the Maritime Industry Authority has been doing its job on vessel safety.
Since it entered into force in 2004, the Domestic Shipping Law or RA 9295 specifically designated Marina to be the sole agency in charge of maritime safety. But with the spate of high-profile maritime disasters since its watch over the last three years, it provokes cynicism on whether RA 9295 is applicable, workable or if the authority has faithfully enforced these. It also confronts the maritime authority if these have capabilities of implementing maritime safety in the first place.
The problem with engines has much to do with responsible ship ownership. It scrutinizes whether engines go through regular maintenance, whether state-of-the-art spare parts are used or whether engine crew members are properly trained. When the problem is the engine, the problem is really a corporate engine that does not uphold safety management or responsible ship management.
When the Coast Guard probes into the problem of engines in the ensuing board inquiry, they will have to look into the problem of Marina’s safety enforcement engines, the problem of the shipping company safety management engines and the problem between Marina and shipowners as they operate the engine of responsible ship ownership. Best of all, the Coast Guard must also get its engines running to mete penalties and axe those accountable or responsible for senseless sea tragedies.