Taliban attacks seek broader strategic payoff

Militants attacked NATO headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on Tuesday armed with light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and suicide vests. Militants took high positions in a 14-story building under construction that allowed them to fire down on the surrounding compounds and hold out for several hours. Setting aside the brazenness of the target area — effectively Afghanistan’s “green zone” — few casualties were inflicted and the security perimeters seem to have held. As a tactical exchange, the Taliban (who quickly claimed credit for the attack) appear to have expended considerable effort, resources and personnel for comparatively limited gain. There are however many ways tactical engagements can contribute to larger, strategic ends.

“if the Taliban continue to engage this target set, it means perception and psychology — foreign or domestic — are their likely objectives.”

Taliban efforts must be viewed not simply in terms of casualty metrics but also in terms of their impact on psychology and perception. Time is generally on the side of an insurgent force fighting a distant, foreign occupier. If the insurgency is not losing, it is winning. If the occupier is not winning — making clear, demonstrable progress — it is generally losing because its domestic population will naturally tend to grow weary of a far-off war faster. Thus, any headline-grabbing attack that shifts perceptions within the occupier’s domestic populace can have a strategic impact, even when tactically the attack is ineffective. The seminal instance of this is the 1968 Tet Offensive. It is widely derided as a military failure, even though it ultimately had a meaningful impact on the American national will to wage the war. The impact included the declining support of American journalist Walter Cronkite, which led then-President Lyndon Johnson to acknowledge that “if I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.”

Reportedly, the Taliban have closely studied the American experience of the Vietnam conflict. They know that they cannot defeat the United States and its allies militarily; massing sufficient forces exposes those forces to the vastly superior firepower that the United States and its allies can quickly bring to bear. So the Taliban continue to conceal themselves within and fight among the general population in a classic guerilla strategy. This tactic allows the Taliban to stave off defeat while grinding down the will of the United States and its allies to continue the fight.

However, Tuesday’s attack may ultimately prove to be a failure in this regard as well. Thus far it has elicited little more than a passing murmur in the Western media. Indeed, despite a series of attacks this year — many more successful and effective than Tuesday’s — the Taliban have yet to elicit a decisive shift in the perceptions of the war and its psychological impact.

After a decade of war in Afghanistan — characterized by halting progress, a bloody experience in Iraq and the United States’ significant economic woes — popular perceptions in the West may be accustomed to the realities of the vulnerability of Westerners in Afghanistan. The Taliban may find it hard to get the Afghan war back into the headlines and on the top of the political agenda.

How effectively the Taliban have harnessed their resources and focused them to this end is unclear. However, attacks such as Tuesday’s are the textbook means of achieving deep shifts in perception and psychology. Even when successful, these attacks rarely have tactical or operational value — their utility is primarily psychological. By implication, if the Taliban continue to engage this target set, it means perception and psychology — foreign or domestic — are their likely objectives.

Even though the Taliban have proven in the last year that they are incapable of dramatically improving their negotiating position, they still hold a strong hand. They perceive themselves to be winning and continue to demonstrate that they are not being defeated — certainly not on a timetable consistent with American and Western wishes. Ultimately, the Taliban are not going anywhere. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies are already drawing down.

The imperative for any party entering the negotiations is to shape those negotiations in a manner that strengthens its own position — this is the Taliban’s challenge. The question at this point is to what extent the Taliban can strengthen its position further through operational efforts. If they are unable to further alter the equation meaningfully, will they begin to negotiate more seriously?