The escalating conflict in the Korean Peninsula is part of a larger regional security picture of the South China Sea. Over 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports from the Middle East pass through the narrow Straits of Malacca, a recognized “choke point” and vital sea lane of communication. China’s current status as the second largest world economy and the continuation of its economic growth depend on assuring unrestricted navigation and trade flow through the Straits. In an era of dwindling natural energy sources, the existence of untapped potential oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea (near the Spratly Islands) is something that world powers, such as China and the United States, will compete for. That there are overlapping territorial claims over the Spratly Islands by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines complicates the situation.
After World War II, the United States adopted a strategy of “containment” because of its anxiety about Communist expansion. Today, it appears that America is still following a “containment” policy, now directed at China, to curb the latter’s growing economic strength, force projection capability, and regional influence in Asia. American bases in Okinawa are there precisely because of concerns about North Korea’s (allied to China) belligerent behavior and US perception of China’s threat to Taiwan. In the Philippines, the US uses the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) to access various sites and servicing facilities in Mindanao for rapid US force deployment capability.
The currently worsening situation between North and South Korea was triggered last March when a South Korean vessel (ROKS Cheonan) was attacked and sank off Baengnyeong Island near the Northern Limit Line that demarcates the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, Japan, and the United States blamed North Korea for the incident. The three allies tried to get a UN Security Council resolution condemning Pyongyang. However, independent analyses conducted by China and Russia (both permanent Security Council members) did not support the official report issued by the US, South Korean, and Japanese investigation panels. No UN Resolution blaming North Korea was passed.
Last June, three US Tomahawk-laden nuclear submarines simultaneously visited Pusan (South Korea), Subic Bay (Philippines), and Diego Garcia (central Indian Ocean) in an obvious display of US military might. A month later in a regional security forum in Vietnam, State Dept. Secretary Hillary Clinton declared that the United States had a national interest in resolving conflicting claims in the South China Sea — a move which China strongly opposed. In August, ships from the US 7th Fleet and South Korean navy conducted joint maneuvers in the waters between the Korean Peninsula and China, further alarming Beijing and exacerbating the already highly-strained situation. Last November, North Korean artillery shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island (also near the Northern Limit Line), prompting China to recommend the holding of emergency discussions (Six-Party Talks) this December among the envoys of South and North Korea, the US, China, Japan, and Russia to defuse the latest crisis on the Korean Peninsula and to tackle North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.
Given this timeline of events, two concerns are raised: How likely is it that the present conflict between North and South Korea may lead China into actual fighting against the United States? What implications does the North Korean problem pose for the Philippines? There are historical, policy statements, and economic considerations which argue that China may not assume a more combative posture, unless something else occurs that pushes it beyond tipping point.
During the period of de-colonization in 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which were later universally accepted by other nations as the fundamental norms guiding international relations — mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. In 1982, the Preamble of the Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of China reiterated its pursuit of an independent foreign policy and adherence to the Five Principles in developing diplomatic relations, and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries.
An official paper on China’s National Defense in 2008 re-affirmed that China “will hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, persist in taking the road of peaceful development, pursue the opening-up strategy of mutual benefit, and promote the building of a harmonious world with enduring peace and common prosperity”. China’s external security concept would feature “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and advocating the settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues by peaceful means. It will encourage the advancement of security dialogues and cooperation with other countries, oppose the enlargement of military alliances, and acts of aggression and expansion. China will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes.” (underscoring supplied)
After the Cold War, world powers turned away from the nuclear option because of the mutually assured destruction that would result. Given today’s globally-interconnected econo-mies, using force to settle disputes would destabilize the already fragile world economy and pose disastrous repercussions on countries that fall into actual fighting. In 2009, the United States (rank 2), Japan (rank 4), and South Korea (rank 5) together accounted for 31 percent of China’s total merchandise exports (US$ 1.2 Trillion). As of Aug 2009, China was America’s top lender, holding US$ 797.1 Billion (23 percent) of U.S. Treasury securities. Japan was no. 2, with US$ 731.0 Billion (21 percent). Both China and the United States implicitly recognize this basic economic reality — which says that the economic and regional security stakes of China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are so enmeshed and too great to allow for any irresponsible behavior and letting the present North Korean situation get out of hand.
In terms of internal security, open conflict could derail China’s economic momentum and compromise its stature as a world power. China has a growing population whose lives have tasted higher standards of living as a result of their country’s phenomenal economic growth. The Communist Party of China is the country’s single-party that has held political power for six decades. Any economic disruption could place the capability of this leadership to shepherd China’s continued growth into public question. Here is a classic “riding the tiger by the tail” situation that further argues for a continuation of policies that have worked for China until now.
Last June, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned, after getting caught in a diplomatic no-win situation between the desire of Japanese citizens in Okinawa to get U.S. bases off their island and the insistence of U.S. Defense and State Department officials on the Okinawa base relocation plan. The threatening behavior of North Korea, whose leadership is under transition from the ailing Kim Jong-Il to his son, Kim Jong Un, and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions make it imperative for the U.S. to keep Okinawa and expand to other friendly locations in the Philippines. America can be expected to more assiduously engage our national leadership (using “smart power”) for continued enforcement of the VFA and MLSA and access other sites in Mindanao as “lily pads” for possible forward deployment, if the necessity comes.