Philippines, China and America in the SCS

The latest news from the South China Sea (SCS) was that the Philippine Navy was holding exercises around Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal. This area has become a hotly-contested area between the Philippines and China.

In “America and the Philippines Should Call China’s Bluff,” an article last year by Marites Danguilan Vitug in Foreign Affairs, she said: “…Manila, with the support of the United States, must look beyond temporary negotiations with China and craft a longer-term approach for mitigating risks in the SCS. Marcos must calibrate his policy of transparency on Chinese provocations to spotlight Beijing’s bullying tactics while also maintaining visibility front against Chinese territorial violations. And Manila must be clear on what it expects from Washington, namely, US support in routine Philippine naval activities such as supply missions in areas that fall within the country’s exclusive economic zone.”

Vitug also issues a warning in the same article: “If the United States fails to provide its ally with the necessary support, Washington and Manila may both be thrown into the kind of escalatory spiral with China that they desperately want to avoid.”

This article was written when Biden was still president. However, the issues that Vitug raised here have become even more relevant with the new Trump administration coming into power this week. The big question for the Philippines is what the policy of the incoming administration will be towards China and the Philippines.

While president-elect Trump has not said anything regarding his policy, he did say during the campaign period that China is the main adversary of the United States. During the Cabinet confirmation hearings, the testimonies of the incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the incoming National Security Council adviser Mike Waltz can give us indications of what the policies will be regarding this part of the world. Rubio said that opposing the Chinese Communist Party should be the focus of the new administration. As Secretary of State, he would likely try to strengthen US alliances in Asia to try to deter China from aggressive military action.

He specifically mentioned that the United States should maintain its commitments to two vital allies, namely Taiwan and the Philippines.

Secretary Rubio, however, may have to contend with president Trump’s skepticism of old allies, believing that American allies in both Europe and Asia are “free riders” who rely too much on American military protection.

The confirmation hearing for the designated Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was both comical and distressing because of his ignorance. He was asked how many nations are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). His reply was that the United States has allies in Japan, South Korea and Australia. He was told by the senators that these countries were not in Southeast Asia.

Vitug in her article said that the Philippines must have a long-term strategy in dealing with China. Any long-term strategy, however, must wait until we are clear what the long-term strategy of the US under its new administration will be. One possible problem is that Trump is known to be a transactional leader and has no long-term strategy. This is the same characteristic that will make him an unpredictable president.

It may be advisable for the Philippine government to try and formulate a long-term independent foreign policy that will remain constant without depending on any alliance.

The main strength of the Marcos administration is that according to a Pulse Asia survey, 76 percent of respondents agreed that the Philippines should continue asserting the country’s rights in the West Philippine Sea. In the same survey, 74 percent wanted the Philippines to work with the United States. Only 5 percent of Filipinos favored working with China.

The one thing that the Philippines can undertake on a long-term basis is to consolidate alliances with other countries, especially with Australia and Japan who have similar fears regarding China. Another area for developing alliances is with the other ASEAN countries, although Vitug’s article sounds as if she is not confident that this can be done. According to her, some member-countries such as Cambodia and Laos are “dependent on China for investments and aid” and are therefore “uninterested in speaking out against Beijing.”

Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country, is not a claimant country and has borrowed heavily from China. The Philippines’ best hopes for possible alliances are Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei who also have maritime disputes with China.

So far, President BBM has said that the Philippine red line is if a Filipino service member is killed in the WPS. This will trigger the Philippines to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States.

The Philippines and China have so far avoided a major conflict by reaching several short-term deals with each other. But recent events show that China is not backing down and the Philippines under President BBM has also no intention of backing down. It is therefore necessary for the Philippines to clarify what it can expect from the United States in the event that tensions escalate in the SCS.