Foundation of the family

Can a marriage bond be severed because the husband is a homosexual? What is the remedy of the wife in such a case? These are the questions answered in this case of Dina and Nardo.

Dina first met Nardo in 1981 when they were still medical students working at a hospital as medical clerks. Dina’s initial impression of Nardo was a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. So in no time they became sweethearts after finishing their medical courses, with Nardo becoming an anesthesiologist and Dina a pediatrician.

At that time, Nardo knew that people around him, including his friends, already doubted his sexual preference. Even Dina heard these rumors and told Nardo about them, but Nardo just denied them and even threatened to sue people spreading those rumors. Yet he did not do anything to prove once and for all the truth of his denials. He just told Dina that there were more important matters to attend to than waste time and effort filing cases and being affected by those people. So putting more premium on Nardo’s denials, Dina married him in 1989, three years after they became sweethearts.

Their marital union appeared to be blissful as they begot three children within the first five years of marriage. But Nardo’s kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In public, he was the picture of a perfect husband and father, but in his private life at home, Dina observed that he was a harsh disciplinarian, more authoritative on what clothes or jewelry would fit her, unreasonably meticulous even over small details in the house like wrongly folded bed sheets, and was easily angered. His unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent quarrels, especially in view of the stark contrast to the lavish affection Nardo had for his mother, to whom he had deep attachment and dependence for decision making.

Dina also noticed Nardo’s peculiar closeness to his male companions. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection to a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Then her worst fears were confirmed when she saw Nardo kiss another man on the lips. When Dina confronted him, he again denied everything. But Dina took her children and left the conjugal abode. Since then, Nardo stopped giving support to their children.

After 11 years of marriage, Dina filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to declare their marriage a nullity on the ground that Nardo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations. To prove her case, she testified and narrated what she experienced during those 11 years of marriage. A clinical psychologist who had a one-time interview with Nardo also testified and presented her conclusion that Nardo was indeed psychologically incapacitated, which incapacity existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.

Nardo did not present any psychologist to refute these findings. Instead, he and his brother just testified denying Dina’s story, explaining and giving his own version.

After trial, the RTC declared that Dina’s petition for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds cannot legally make a case of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code (FC). But it still nullified the marriage because of Nardo’s homosexuality, which is incompatible with heterosexual marriage since the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively and only between a man and a woman.

The RTC ruled that Nardo’s denial of his homosexuality is a concealment that constitutes fraud in obtaining Dina’s consent to their marriage, which is a ground for annulment under Article 45 (3) in relation to Article 46 (4) of the Family Code. Was the RTC correct?

No. Even assuming that Nardo is a homosexual, the RTC cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Dina. A marriage may be annulled when consent of either party is obtained by fraud such as concealment of homosexuality. It is concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates consent of the innocent party. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutes fraud. It presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. Dina failed to prove this fundamental element.

Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as ground to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most it is only a ground for legal separation or separation from bed and board under Article 55 (6) of the FC. So Dina’s petition should be for legal separation only.

The constitutional policy is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration. Thus, any doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage (Almenor vs RTC of Las Piñas City, G.R. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008).