PBBM’s narrative trap

“Unity is our ideology,” declared President Bongbong Marcos in the recent signing of a coalition agreement between his Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP) and the National Unity Party (NUP). This declaration of political alliance (re-)building comes in the wake of the apparent break up of the UniTeam coalition that catapulted him and Vice President Sara Duterte to record victory. On the eve of the President’s third State of the Nation Address (SONA), the populist’s daughter appoints herself as the government’s “designated survivor.” So, whatever happened to unity?

In his second SONA, PBBM proudly trumpeted the dawn of Bagong Pilipinas (New Philippines). “I know that the state of the nation is sound and is improving. The New Philippines has arrived,” he said. The new government slogan recalls Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s Bagong Lipunan (New Society), which envisioned strengthening economic, financial and trade institutions, allowing foreign investment and developing agriculture. Structural deficiencies, external shocks, human rights violations and crony capitalism ultimately eroded the first Marcos presidency.

Marcos Jr. wants to provide “a comfortable, resilient and tranquil life for every Filipino,” taking a cue from his father. However, promise and reality diverge significantly under the second Marcos presidency.

According to the Pulse Asia June 2024 survey, 72 percent of Filipinos are concerned about inflation. The President obtained a majority approval rating of 53 percent. However, distrust in the President rose six percentage points to 21 percent in June from 15 percent in March, with Mindanao registering a high 32 percent compared to 28 percent in March.

Stories presidents tell

In a forthcoming book, Prof. Mark Thompson and I argue a presidency may serve as a prequel or a sequel to a political narrative. Given the absence of programmatic political parties in the country, we speak of political narratives as the “stories presidents tell.” These stories bring together the most powerful strategic interest groups, whose support can make or break a president.

Presidents are strong when they have clear political narratives, the support of powerful strategic groups like the Catholic church, business oligarchs, political clans, civil society activists and the military, and the blessing or criticism of foreign powers (particularly the US but increasingly China) that may strengthen or protect them from popular discontent.

However, some presidents have faced societal issues when their narratives have been discredited, strategic elites have turned against them, they have lost military authority and Congress and the courts have turned against them.

The narrative trap

Stories weave ideas and events meaningfully. A president must convey a compelling narrative from campaigning to delivering the inaugural address. Thus, Philippine presidential regimes consist of quasi-programmatic, emotive election campaigns and a governance script that unites a coalition of strategic interests and sustains a public mandate within an institutional setting. Presidents are also part of a political system that evaluates the credibility of their political narratives.

When a governing script “stories” diverge too far from political reality, resulting in erosion of support or even outright antagonism from the critical strategic groups in the country, a “narrative trap” occurs.

Ferdinand Marcos Sr., with an initially strong narrative of developmentalism, was eroded gradually by the financial and political crisis following the Aquino assassination, as well as by the sight of a sick and feeble husk of a strongman. The country’s first populist president, Joseph Estrada, championed the poor (“Erap para sa mahirap” or Erap for the poor) but drew flak from critical strategic groups – key civil society activists, traditional big business, the Catholic Church and, ultimately, military– triggered by a series of corruption scandals. People power uprisings ousted both presidents.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s narrative of good governance and building a “Strong Republic” after the scandals of the Estrada presidency was undermined by accusations of electoral fraud and major corruption scandals in her own administration.

Noynoy Aquino vowed to take a “straight path” (“daang matuwid”) to clean up corruption, which he also claimed would eradicate poverty (“kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” or if there’s no corruption, there’s no poverty). However, his reliance on pork-barrel politics to push for his anti-corruption agenda was the beginning of the erosion of the “Yellow narrative.”

Rodrigo Duterte was able to tap into the “politics of anger,” which was organized around the anti-establishment and unorthodox mayor who promised the coming of real change (“tunay na pagbabago”). Yet, he became too cozy with China.

PBBM’s fuzzy narrative

The Marcos political comeback was fueled by nostalgia and continuity. The Marcos myth of the “golden age” was meant to evoke nostalgia for what was “lost” both to the Marcos dynasty and the country. Through the UniTeam alliance, BBM was perceived in 2022 by the Duterte supporters as their “continuity” candidate.

To the surprise of everyone, including the staunch anti-Marcos opposition, PBBM, in his first two years, has taken some critical domestic and foreign policy positions that diverged from Rodrigo Duterte – the release of former senator Leila de Lima, the dropping of cases against Rappler, a reorientation of the drug war and the security pivot back to the United States.

In effect, PBBM is emulating an early version of his father – democratically-elected, cold warrior, pro-US. Thus far, he has avoided becoming the authoritarian Marcos the Duterte supporters expected him to be. This fuzzy narrative, however, has the potential to mutate into his narrative trap.

His third SONA, the upcoming midterm elections and the remainder of his term provide opportunities for his administration to reframe Bagong Pilipinas into a development vision that will address the basic socio-economic demands of the people, maintain an open democratic space, hold past and present public officials to account and protect our sovereignty from external aggression.

If he succeeds, it will become his narrative of redemption.

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Julio C. Teehankee, Ph.D. is a Full Professor of Political Science at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University.