Unlike the coast guards of the Philippines and other countries, which are civilian agencies, the China Coast Guard is under the command of its Central Military Commission. The CMC, chaired by President Xi Jinping himself, controls all of China’s military branches along with the Rocket Force, the Joint Logistic Support Force and the Strategic Support Force that handles cyber and space security. Unlike civilian coast guards, the CCG is authorized to use lethal force against foreign vessels.
Any hostile act of the China Coast Guard against Philippine vessels must therefore be regarded as a military action. And blasting any Philippine Coast Guard vessel with a water cannon within the West Philippine Sea cannot be considered a friendly action by the CCG. It is Chinese military aggression conducted within Philippine sovereign waters, as defined under the 2016 arbitral ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague – a ruling based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
On Aug. 5, a CCG ship used a water cannon on PCG vessels escorting civilian boats on a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal. The shoal is one of the features in the South China Sea that was specifically mentioned in the arbitral award, over which the Philippines has sovereign rights and exclusive maritime entitlements. The arbitral ruling also invalidated China’s sweeping nine-dash-line claim over nearly the entire South China Sea.
The Philippines has filed multiple protests againt illegal Chinese Coast Guard activities in the West Philippine Sea, including swarming of CCG and militia vessels to block Filipino fishing boats, and aiming a powerful laser beam at a PCG ship. So far, Beijing has shrugged off the protests.
The latest incident occurred just days after CMC supreme commander Xi Jinping and his top foreign affairs team welcomed former president Rodrigo Duterte to Beijing, with the Marcos administration kept in the dark about the visit. Despite Duterte’s meeting with President Marcos days after the trip, details provided to the media about what transpired with Xi remain vague, except for the reiteration of China’s message of friendship with the Philippines.
Friends don’t train water cannons at the other’s ship, especially one on a resupply mission. Friends don’t drive away the other’s fishing boats from its own waters. And friends don’t prevent freedom of navigation and flight beyond their domains as defined under international rules.
The Philippines needs to recalibrate its responses to the activities of the CCG, including drawing on its alliances with other countries for a more effective response to Chinese military aggression.