Maharlika fond
It looks like, despite how economists and academics have scrutinized and critiqued the proposal to create a new sovereign wealth fund, the administration just won’t let it go.
Please don’t ask me which version of the bill I’m referring to, because there are multiple versions. It’s no small task to run around chasing and comparing them (hence, it’s relatively easy for staffers to do a switcheroo in Congress, or insert a few lines here and there). Suffice it to say when a defender of the bill goes on record, the bill version he might be referring to might be something entirely different from what we could be reading.
The Management Association of the Philippines and the UP School of Economics Alumni Association just submitted a letter to the Senate detailing a couple of concerns with House Bill 6608, the version supposedly passed by the House.
They object to using the Bangko Sentral as a milking cow for the Maharlika Investment Fund. They also object to having the national government guarantee the debts of the fund --because while that guarantee will certainly make the debt super attractive, it will also lessen any incentive for diligence (and accountability) in issuing debt.
However, they didn’t express the fear that most of us have been feeling, which is that the fund is just going to be a gigantic (and legal) vehicle for lining the pockets of the powerful (well, as members of the professional class, they had to pretend to be respectful).
In response to the multiple criticisms of the original House version, House Representative Joey Salceda said he and his crew have re-engineered the bill, and taken out the Bangko Sentral (and other government banks) from the equation. This was meant to allay concerns the Bangko Sentral would be hamstrung. But this version wasn’t what was submitted as the Senate version by Senator Mark Villar. So where’s the supposed re-engineered version?
Never mind that. We wake up to news that Marcos is intending to sell government assets via privatization to fund the fund. Brilliant. Now corrupt politicians can make money in multiple ways. Not only can they get kickbacks, commissions, or fixer’s fees in the privatization process, they can also milk the fund once the purchase price (or what’s left of it) makes its way into the fund.
It may have been timely for the news to break out that eight upstanding citizens recently trooped to Malacañang expecting to take oath as government officials. They admitted to paying substantial sums to fixers, who promised them plum positions. Marcos was even supposed to administer their oaths.
Unfortunately, when they got to the Palace they were met with the shocking news they had been duped. There were no positions waiting for them, Marcos wasn’t even around. The nerve. After they had paid so much?!
On a side note, I’m wondering why, considering the penchant for the administration to name citizens caught for crimes like drunk driving or drug dealing, they can’t reveal the names of these rich buyers of Cabinet positions. Must be wealthy indeed, that they want to remain in bed with them?
Eureka. So, perhaps, that’s where our beloved greedy politicians, who just can’t let go of the idea of the fund, can source the fund’s initial capital. Our government can go around and look for equally greedy private citizens willing to buy their way into the government and tap them to invest in whatever schemes interest them. They can be given names and titles like undersecretary of the wealth fund or deputy secretary of sovereign richness. Something catchy, dignified.
As they say, when you’re thick as thieves, the more the merrier (I totally made that up).
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