No grave abuse of discretion

The general policy of courts is not to interfere in the preliminary investigations conducted by the office of the prosecutor unless there is grave abuse of discretion. So, as a general rule, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at a least prima facie case. This is explained in this case of Andy.

Andy used to be under the care of Heart of Mary Villa, a caring agency run by the Good Shepherd sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. When Andy was then over a year old, the spouses Pepe and Lorna and their four daughters, Gina, Lita, Minda and Naty came to know Andy and have Andy spend a few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage.

When Andy was two years and nine months old, he formally became the ward of the spouses Pepe and Lorna by virtue of an “Affidavit of Consent To Legal Guardianship” executed in their favor by sister Conchita, superior of the caring agency.

As Andy was growing up, the spouses and their children noticed that Andy’s physical and cognitive growth was remarkably delayed and did not appear normal. At the age of three to four years, he could only crawl on his tummy like a frog and had not uttered his first word until he turned five years old.

At age six the spouses first enrolled Andy but he experienced significant learning difficulties. So, at age 11 Andy was taken to specialists for neurological and psychological evaluation. The evaluation revealed that Andy was suffering from mild mental deficiency, so he was transferred to another school for special children.

When Andy was 24 years old, the spouses approached a urologist/surgeon, Dr. Amante, to have him vasectomized. Dr. Amante asked that Andy be first evaluated by a psychiatrist to confirm and validate whether Andy could validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.

The psychiatrist, Dr. Paredes, recommended that the responsibility of decision making may be given to the parent or guardian because of mild to moderate mental deficiency by reason of which he may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risk, benefits and consequences of vasectomy that his family wants for his protection. Hence Dr. Amante performed a bilateral vasectomy on Andy.

Five months thereafter, Gina, the eldest daughter of Pepe and Lorna, instituted a criminal complaint for violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 7616 for falsification mutilation and child abuse.

The Assistant City Prosecutor, however, found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of, particularly mutilation, because though the vasectomy rendered Andy unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent provisions of the penal code (Article 262) which defines the crime as “intentionally mutilating another by depriving him either totally or partially of some essential organs of reproduction.”

This ruling was affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and by the Court of Appeals. Is the CA correct in affirming the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor?

Yes, said the Supreme Court (SC). According to the SC, vasectomy does not deprive a man totally or partially of some essential organ of reproduction. In vasectomy, the tubular passage called the “vas deferens,” through which the sperm cells are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the semenal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided, and the cut ends merely tied. Even assuming that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, its cutting does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system.

Thus, it does not constitute the crime of mutilation or the deprivation of a limb or essential part of the body. The SC said that courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, they have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. The exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive department. That is not the case herein (Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice, et. Al. G.R No. 170723, March 3, 2008).