Our foreign policy

Richard Heydarian, that astute political commentator, has his regular column Horizons in the Inquirer; last week, he titled it “Philippine Foreign Policy,” and it made me think about our continuing relations with other countries, particularly the United States and China; both are now competing for global influence. Within the last generation, China had developed so fast, having woken from a lethargy imposed by Western imperialism.

Both countries are on a collision course on many issues, trade most of all, free passage in the South China Sea and the traditional American emphasis on human rights. Is it necessary for us to side with China now and abandon or modify our alliance with the United States? China is a neighbor, a vast market for our products. We have a small but powerful ethnic Chinese minority which China has officially asked to help advance her interests. And finally, we have a President who has succumbed to China’s dulcet lure.

Is Heydarian correct? On the other hand, let us consider the experiences of some countries that are small like us.

I bring to mind Switzerland, which was neutral in global conflicts and has survived handsomely. Then here in our part of the world, Thailand illustrated how it has adroitly managed to keep away from the clutches of Western imperialism. But in World War II, Thailand opened its gates to let the Japanese in.

Today, Thailand is doing very well, and maybe without meaning to, Heydarian has pointed the way to the future for us: we have to be friends with everyone and antagonize no one, but at the same time, we also have to be sure that we have the capability to defend our sovereignty. As a former American colony, America has influenced us profoundly, our foreign policy anchored on the closest relations with America. Whereas, in reality, the Philippines does not matter much to America.

American foreign policy was well defined since the 18th century when it proclaimed the Monroe doctrine, which opposes any country that will colonize the Americas. It is, of course, very hypocritical for this is precisely what the United States had done with its promotion of the banana republics there.

However, the Marshall plan, which developed post-war Europe, is one of the brilliant highlights of a far-reaching American foreign policy after World War II, and while the rise of the Soviet Union became a threat to American power, America’s rigid anti-communist policy ended badly in Vietnam, where the Americans replaced the French colonialists. The Americans failed to realize it was Asian nationalism it was fighting there, not communism.

And now China, that vast country emerging from lethargy, celebrated its 100th anniversary last week with Xi Jinping, the Party’s Chairman and that nation’s President, announcing that it will not allow itself to be bullied when it is itself the bully. Its forces and Indian troops are now facing each other in the Himalayas while in the South China Sea, which it claims as its own, China and the United States are also playing chicken. I do not think any of these three world powers are going to wage full-scale war soon. Nobody will profit; what they are doing is nibbling at each other’s territories, and what Putin is doing to Russia’s neighbors is apparently succeeding.

High hopes were raised that, with economic development, China will liberalize and democratize; this has not happened. Meanwhile, China’s surge is unstoppable, taking huge chunks of influence where Western countries had not been active, in Africa, in South America. China has to do this to feed its people.

It is following the American model as successfully as Japan did. Japan, particularly, lost its empire but has become wealthier without it. The new engine for today’s imperialism is trade, and the logic of trade is for the strong to take advantage of the weak. Aware of this logic, we should know what to do to compete, to build our productive capacity and to modernize and enlarge our Armed Forces. “Speak softly and carry a big stick” is one of the precepts of American foreign policy. Ours may not be a big stick, but it should be hard and strong. Then, we must look at our neighbors, ASEAN. Alone, we are weak; together with our neighbors, we can be strong.

When I joined the Manila Times in 1949 and had the opportunity to travel in the region, I realized how far ahead we were compared to our neighbors. I realized how strong we could have been if we bonded together. This brought to mind what happened to my barrio when I was ten years old. Barrio Cabugawan was gutted by fire. All the farmhouses were roofed with grass, the walls of buri palm leaves, the posts and the floor were bamboo. I saw the sparks fly from one house to the other. We had cans of water on the ready for such calamities, but they did not help much. Could this also happen to countries?

When I set up my journal, Solidarity, one of its specific purposes is to promote Southeast Asian cooperation. Nothing original; even before World War II, some Filipino intellectuals had already proposed the idea. After World War II, Indonesia’s Sukarno was its champion. ASEAN could be as viable as the European Union which took almost 40 years to shape. There are many obstacles, among them the disparity in economic development – Singapore is the most developed. Almost all the ASEAN countries are also competitors in trade. And in its present composition, the unanimity rule is an obstruction, making ASEAN a social club, unable to act on serious national crises such as Burma’s military dictatorship and the Rohingya minority genocide.

In the 1960s, when I set up the Foreign Service Institute, I was only too aware of our need to have a foreign relations policy that was clear but changeable in consonance with our needs. As an aide to then secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez, I had several conversations with him. President Diosdado Macapagal then was for regionalism, and Pelaez’s clear vision for foreign relations was direct: In negotiating foreign treaties, our permanent national interest is paramount. Is it good for us? If compromise is inevitable, what are the consequences, can we afford them?