Incapacity and lack of consent

Pursuant to the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552), the written consent of the following persons are necessary to an adoption:  (1) the adoptee/s if 10 years of age or over; (2) the biological parent(s) or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the adoptee(s); (3) the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters of the adopters and adoptees, if any, who are 10 years or over; (4) the illegitimate sons/daughters of the adopter who are living with him/her if 10 years of age or over; and (5) the spouse of the adopter or the adoptees, if any. But if there is no consent of the biological mother, can the adoption be still valid? When can the adoption be valid even without such consent? Is the financial capability of the adopter necessary for the adoption to be valid? These are the questions answered in this case.

This is the case of Greg and Aileen, husband and wife. In their five years of happy and comfortable married life, they begot three children, Joy, Ruby and Gela. Unfortunately, Greg tragically died, just a year after Gela’s birth. After Greg’s death, Aileen’s in-laws continued providing support for Aileen and her children. Aileen however was ashamed of just depending on their support, so she decided to work in Italy as a domestic helper. Aileen’s parents mortgaged their farmland to cover the expenses of Aileen’s trip even if they themselves are undergoing maintenance medication. Aileen left her three children under the care and custody of her mother-in-law who acted as their guardian.

While working in Italy, Aileen met Nico, another Filipino who was already a married man but was planning to file an annulment of his marriage although he is providing regular support to his legitimate family. Aileen and Nico became live-in partners and had a son. The three of them were already considered Italian residents, but Aileen still sends financial support for the needs and education of her children here.

Ten years after Aileen left to work abroad, her mother-in-law and guardian of her children here, died. So Alma, her sister-in-law, filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the adoption of Joy, Ruby and Gela. She alleged that Aileen went abroad and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicates with her children here; that Aileen’s children here are being financially supported by her and her children and relatives abroad; that because her mother and guardian of the children already died, she is qualified to adopt Aileen’s children as she is a 57-year-old widow, a US citizen living alone in Guam where she is working as a restaurant server, with married children who are gainfully employed and have their own families and have given their consent to the adoption; that she came back to the Philippines to spend time with Aileen’s children; and that her brother who earns substantial income is willing and committed to support the minors while they are under her custody.

After the RTC referred the petition to the DSWD to conduct a case study and to submit a report thereon, Alma was allowed to present her evidence ex parte as there was no opposition to the Petition. After hearing Alma’s testimony and considering the report and recommendation of the Social Welfare Officer, who did not even testify and offer in evidence Aileen’s consent which she allegedly obtained, the RTC granted Alma’s petition.

But the Court of Appeals reversed this decision because the written consent of Aileen was not offered as evidence and the consent of Alma’s children residing in Guam was not properly authenticated by the US consul and therefore inadmissible as evidence. Alma assailed this decision and appealed to the Supreme Court. She claimed that Aileen’s consent is no longer necessary because she already abandoned her children. She also insisted that she is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Supreme Court however denied Alma’s appeal. The SC ruled that the decision on adoption should not be anchored solely on the best interest of the child but likewise with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Hence the written consent of Aileen the biological parent is indispensable. In this case, there is no such consent.

Abandonment by the biological parent, or her neglect and refusal to perform her filial obligation of love and support, may really justify the adoption of the child without her consent. Merely permitting the children to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not abandonment. In this case, when Aileen left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled by financial constraints. Joy still consults her for serious personal problems. Likewise, Aileen continues to send financial support to her children, though in minimal amounts as compared to that of her in-laws. Besides, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be paramount in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over her/his children or to permanently sever parent-child relationship.

Furthermore, the affidavits of consent of Aileen and her children were not submitted in evidence but merely identified. Mere identification and marking as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered with their purposes specified.

And since the primary consideration is the best interest of the child, the adopter should be in a position to support the adoptees. In this case, Alma is 57 years, employed in Guam on a part time basis as a waitress. Thus it is doubtful whether she can sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing three children in another country (Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. 164948, June 27, 2006)

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