China’s design in SCS; impact on Phl security

What does China really want in the South China Sea? Westerners see it only from their side: freedom of navigation, the safety of allies, and upholding a rules-based order. That viewpoint will never solve the sea dispute, militarily or by confidence building, says expert Bill Hayton. The author who demolished China’s fake history of SCS ownership takes off from Chinese motivations. Excerpts from his recent article, “What the West Doesn’t Get about China,” in the Nikkei Asian Review:

“China’s actions are based on a sense of national entitlement to the islands, reefs and waters of the SCS, reflecting nationalist readings of regional history. This sense of entitlement is likely to lead China to make even more assertive moves in the future – a creeping annexation of strategic and resource-rich areas – that will result in further confrontations.

“Strategic considerations are, of course, very important to China. For a country dependent on trade, access to the open ocean through the SCS is a matter of national survival. China has been a net importer of food since 2007, and in 2013 it surpassed the US to become the world’s largest net oil importer. Foreign trade makes up 40 percent of China’s GDP, yet the country has no clear access to the open sea.

“A second element to this ‘defensive’ agenda is to strengthen an ‘anti-access/area denial’ strategy against US support of Taiwan in the event of a conflict. China’s new island bases bolster monitoring by the country’s early warning systems, facilitate tracking of potential targets and offer dispersed havens for warships and aircraft.

“A third element is that China is expected to use the deep-water areas of the SCS to provide a base for its new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines. The island building is also meant to deter Southeast Asian claimants taking actions to prevent China from exploiting natural resources there.

“Underpinning these ‘defensive’ motivations is a chauvinistic version of history. Despite extensive evidence to the contrary, the official Chinese view is that only its ships ever used the SCS and so China has ‘historic rights’ to waters inside its ‘U-shaped line’ claim. In July 2016, an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague ruled there were no legitimate grounds for China to claim ‘historic rights.’ Nonetheless, this argument continues to underpin the conflict between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors.

“Beijing’s South China Sea claim was mainly developed in the first half of the 20th century in response to Japanese and European imperialism, and it is this aspect of its history that still makes it such an emotive issue today.

“The US and other governments have wisely remained neutral on the territorial question. But that does not mean they should ignore it. If analysts discount the historical elements and focus only on questions of grand strategy, they will end up answering the wrong question, leaving the problem of the SCS to fester. The result is likely to be continuing conflict. The root cause of China’s sense of entitlement needs to be addressed.

“All states seeking a peaceful settlement need to take the history seriously and assert that unsupported claims are not a viable basis for dialogue and conflict resolution. A critical engagement in discussions with China about the basis of its South China Sea narrative is an essential first step by producing evidence to challenge bogus historical narratives. In the past 20 years, all this evidence has become easily available. It is time to use it.’ (Full text http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20170406/Viewpoints/Bill-Hayton-What-the-West-doesn-t-get-about-China?page=1)

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“The Philippines faces very serious security challenge in two fronts,” former national security adviser Roilo Golez warns. “How it plays out could critically affect the balance of power in Asia Pacific.” Excerpts from his recent speech before Southeast Asian strategists:

“Since 2012, the focus of analysts has been Scarborough Shoal west of the Philippines. China seized Scarborough in 2012 and there have been speculations on when China would militarize the shoal like it has done in Mischief Reef inside the Philippine EEZ, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and much earlier the Paracels.

“Then last month was announced the sighting of a Chinese survey ship that stayed more than three months in Benham Rise, a 13-million hectare extended continental shelf awarded to the Philippines.

“Chinese military contingents are already positioned in various reefs, islets, and rocks of the SCS. Scarborough is just one more step forward in their bid to secure full control of the world’s second busiest international sea-lane.

“China, using a combination of soft and hard power and skillful diplomacy, will eventually have massive construction on Scarborough and transform it into a huge military complex, complete with runways and harbors and multipurpose buildings, resorts and tourism facilities, giving it a harmless image of a civilian complex as is their usual strategy. Note that they call their artificial islands in the SCS ‘civilian facilities.’

“A few days ago, China’s defense minister and premier announced that their facilities in the SCS are for civilian use. Now there is this fighter jet, a J-11, on Woody Island (Paracels) with at least a 1,500-km radius and can reach Manila, parts of Luzon, Palawan and Visayas.

“A militarized Scarborough would complete China’s Strategic Triangle giving it full control of the SCS.

“China is interested in Benham Rise because of two strategic reasons: (1) Oceanographic data for use in future attack and ballistic submarine deployment; (2) Data on strategic natural resources like fish (China’s food supply is getting very critical), and energy (oil, gas, methane, etc., alternate supplies to support rapid industrialization).

“Why would the Philippines and Benham Rise be of strategic interest to China? It’s because of the geo-strategic concept of The First Island Chain and The Second Island Chain.

“In the ’90s before their spectacular economic rise, breaking out of the First Island Chain was unthinkable for China because of the overwhelming might of the US forces and their allies. We all remember the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 when the US deployed two carrier battle groups backed by an amphibious assault ship. One carrier and the amphibious assault ship sailed through the Taiwan Strait while the other carrier was on standby in the vicinity and China backed off.

“Now, it will be different. US forces cannot anymore sail through the Strait of Taiwan in a provocative manner without facing grave risks and must project their power from a safer distance to prevent a Chinese breakthrough beyond the First Island Chain.

“The Philippines is east of the First Island Chain and the length of our archipelago covers the southern segment of the First Island Chain. The Philippines is a barrier because of its alliance with the US. The Philippines can be a gateway if that alliance is reversed depending on geopolitical developments.” (Full text http://roilogolez.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-philippines-faces-very-serious.html)

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