Con-ass

Too bad, media attention focused on that near-brawl between Ace Barbers and Butch Pichay during the House committee hearing on the mode of amending the Basic Law. The substantial business of that hearing was hardly mentioned.

During that meeting, the “supermajority” decided to adopt the method of constituent assembly (con-ass) to undertake constitutional reform. This was done after only one hearing – and even when no document was presented to the legislators describing the mechanics of such a method.

There is no way, considering how the congressmen are stacked up, that the “supermajority” could lose any vote at the House. There is really no need to indulge in obvious railroading, an exercise that could only distress many citizens.

Maverick Buhay party-list Rep. Lito Atienza was the single voice arguing against convening a constituent assembly to achieve Charter change. He pleaded with his colleagues to allow for more deliberation on such a vital question. Congress, after all, is a deliberative body where issues are threshed out for the benefit of the people even if the pro-administration solons control the vote with an awesome majority.

Initially, Atienza asked for the working papers that should be the basis of a committee vote. There was none. So confident were the majority in the power of their numbers, they did not even bother to work out in clearer detail the proposal for which a vote was called.

When this matter resurfaces in plenary session, Atienza’s implacable resistance to the conversion of Congress into a constituent assembly will continue. He will still ask for the details of the proposal that the majority in the committee so hastily voted for.

For instance, the congressmen obviously prefer joint rather than separate voting between the two chambers of Congress. This is one of those vague things in the carelessly written 1987 Constitution.

That may not be the Senate’s preference. Should the two chambers disagree, the matter may be brought up to the Supreme Court where it could drag on for years. Instead of expediting the work of constitutional reform, the issue could entrap proceedings.

The Senate will very likely refuse to collapse the institution of the upper house should congressmen decide to shift to a unicameral assembly. The senators will fight that tooth and nail, preventing the work of constitutional renovation.

Atienza reminds his colleagues that none of them were elected to undertake constitutional renovation. None of them campaigned on that basis. Charter change, after all, ranks very low in the hierarchy of public concerns.

In fact, most of those who now compose the “supermajority” expressed preference for calling a constitutional convention. That was when Rodrigo Duterte expressed that preference when he was still a candidate.

When Duterte changed his mind, shifting preference for a constituent assembly, members of the “supermajority” likewise changed their minds. This is an ominous sign, says Atienza. It tells us that the “supermajority” which wants to arrogate unto itself the power to draft a new Charter will likely be dictated upon by President Duterte. Majority legislators seem only too willing to change their minds when the President changes his.

 Despite dire warnings that calling elections for a proper constitutional convention will only open a backdoor for losing politicians to maneuver and shape our nation’s future, Atienza believes a duly elected assembly will actually be more independent. The sitting legislators are compromised by their partisanship. There is better hope in convening non-partisan delegates.

Atienza points to the 1971 Constitutional Convention to support his arguments.

Despite Ferdinand E. Marcos’ tight grip over our politics during that time, he was never really able to fully control the Convention --- whether through threats or through bribes. It was only after he imposed martial law that he got his way.

Marcos might as well have written the 1973 Constitution himself. The final document emerging after a good number of delegates were thrown into prison was tailor-fit for the authoritarianism he created.

The autocrat managed the document to the smallest detail. The Transitory Provisions even contained a provision barring delegates who vote against the charter from holding public office for a good number of years.

The surprising thing about the 1971 Constitutional Convention was that traditional political clans failed to dominate the assembly. Exceptional lawyers emerged from the woodwork in significant number, supported by the localities that knew of their talent and their integrity.

The names Marcelo Fernan and Hilario Davide began public careers at the Convention. They later rose to the highest echelons of the judiciary.

Young idealist firebrands came from nowhere to get themselves elected delegates. Some of them have funny names: Heherson Alvarez, Voltaire Garcia and Dick Gordon. Except for Voltaire, who figured in UP campus politics and then died young, the rest of the young idealists of that time rose to become persistent personalities in our politics.

Converting Congress into a constituent assembly might seem like a seductively alluring option for those who want expeditiousness in this business of Charter change. The fact is, however, the elected legislators, because they are politically compromised, could produce a document our people will refuse to trust.

Rushing the job might endanger our constitutional order. We might get through this job quickly but only if it is railroaded. After all the work, a suspicious electorate could reject the outcome.

By contrast, a constitutional convention will be composed by delegates specifically elected to renovate the basic law. Once convened, there is no authority that can disband this assembly or restrict the independence of the delegates.

But that is precisely what those now in power fear.