Bottom line: Will additional US presence deter bully-China?

Last Monday I wrote about Manila’s limp-wristed policy towards Taiwanese poachers. Not a Filipino official, but a spokesman of the US protectorate took issue with it. He claimed that the Taiwanese fisherman shot dead by Philippine Coast Guards last May was not an intruder or a poacher, since it happened within the overlapping EEZs of the Philippines and Taiwan.

The records stand. The Coast Guards spotted two alien trawlers within the Balintang Channel, a narrow passage — internal Philippine waters — between the Batanes and Babuyan islands. The chase ended 40 miles off the Philippine baseline, or 28 miles into the overlying EEZs. So says the (politicized) NBI report, which Taiwan hails in its ceremonial homicide raps against the eight Coast Guards who “wrongfully applied a deadly weapon.”

The Philippine EEZ overlaps well beyond central Taiwan. Yet, Filipinos commonsensically do not fish up to there, but keep a safe far distance. Taipei reciprocally must respect Philippine internal and closely outlying waters.

Question: if the Taiwanese trawlers last May were not intruding and poaching in known Philippine waters, why did they evade routine approach of a marked fisheries patrol boat, that just happened to have Coast Guards onboard?

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Diplomats are odd-looking persons, and you would be too if you went around with your tongue in your cheek all the time. Foreign and defense officials did look weird in using up three straight days to justify talks for additional US troop presence in the Philippines. And still they couldn’t get to the point.

Understandably the negotiators avoided any allusion of a sellout: “This (is) not to please the US, but in pursuit of our own interests.” They needed to present the parley as one between equals: “This will enable (both sides) to conduct activities like joint exercises.” There were poises of constitutional compliance: “Your government is committed to defend and protect the country’s sovereignty and territory.” And there were downplays of Manila’s true motive: “(Joint) exercises can include prepositioning of equipment for disaster response and development of Philippine facilities.”

The diplomatese notwithstanding, Filipinos know the bottom line. The Philippines is under threat. China is no longer just waving a claim to the entire South China (West Philippine) Sea; it has invaded Philippine fishing grounds and trespassed Philippine offshore oilfields. Militarily incapable of defending the resources, the Philippines is looking for help from world powers. Naturally first in the invitee list is the US, erstwhile colonizer (starting 1898), military tenant (ending 1992), and ally.

The “ally” part is uncertain, the negotiators know only too well. Deceit has dented Philippine-US ties several times, from America’s fast-break into Intramuros ahead of victorious revolucionarios and desertion in Bataan, to the Philippines’ throw-out of Clark and Subic bases and retreat from Iraq. But more reasons abound to validate historical friendship. The U.S. had rearmed the exiled Katipunan high command, instituted a public school system, granted residency to five million Filipinos; the Philippines helped America fight three wars: Japan, Korea, Vietnam. The unsteady alliance will be tested, now that the Philippines is in trouble.

Any US troop presence must conform to the Mutual Defense Treaty. The US has affirmed to reinforce the Philippines in case of mainland invasion, but not in skirmishes in disputed islands like the Spratlys. China has invaded Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef within the Philippine EEZ, under the UNCLOS. But the US is not a signatory to that UN treaty. Besides, the Philippines has brought the sea grab before UN arbitrators, so no US mutual defense is needed till after a UN ruling (which China is likely to lose by default). But China is out to grab Ayungin and Sabina Shoals, Recto Bank, and other seamarks close to Philippine coasts. Joint patrols can come in handy in their vicinity.

A true diplomat lets the other side do all the talking while he gets what he wants. The U.S. panel has not said much, aside from announcing its members. Still, the Philippines keeps signaling that it knows what the other side wants. It does so by referring to “US rotational presence.” Crucial to US security strategy is the continual training of its active and reserve forces in all types of warfare and terrain. The Philippines has open seas and straits, jungles and fields for such purpose, at a time when less and less states are willing to host US troops. That’s the basic benefit for the US of the talks.

Still, the mutual objective of additional US troops is the deterrent effect on China. Already the neighborhood bully is barking against Manila’s invitation for the US Pacific Fleet to reenter Subic base. For expansionist China, such is provocation. Careful not to spoil the UN mediation, the Philippines is telling China not to worry, for it intends only to learn more about modern defense. But of course, diplomacy is the art of saying “Nice doggie!” till you can fund a rock to hit it with. And China knows who’s the doggie here.

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