A million people massed at Cairo’s Tahrir Square last Sunday, reminiscent of the heady protests that brought down the heavy-handed regime of Hosni Mubarak. This time, however, the crowds were demanding the resignation of Muhamad Morsy, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and brought to power exactly a year ago in the first free elections ever held in Egypt.
One year after electing Morsy to the presidency, it seems the Egyptian people changed their minds. The economy remains on its knees. Youth unemployment is at historic highs. The Morsy government has not only exhibited authoritarian tendencies, it seems to be a touch too socially conservative, a touch too Islamic for the adamantly cosmopolitan urban Egyptians.
The Muslim Brotherhood is not without its social base, however. The Islamist movement enjoys robust support from rural and older Egyptians, from communities with more conservative values. This base of support allowed Morsy to organize counter-demonstrations.
At the crux, the deepening confrontation in the streets of Egypt is about the direction this ancient society will take going forward. The young protestors in the streets are drawn from the cosmopolitan middle classes who look forward to a more secular, more liberal society driven by a modern economy. The conservatives yearn for a return to the community of virtue idealized by Islamic custom.
Some fear the protests would continue to escalate, driven by the deepening polarization in Egyptian society. It could reach a point where the military, the guarantor of order since Egypt won independence, might be forced to step in and retake power for itself.
Such an outcome will return Egypt to what it was before Mubarak was overthrown: a secular but undemocratic society, a modernizing but unaccountable politics and an economy held back by corruption. Those protesting in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria seem to prefer a less-than-democratic regime to one dominated by Islamists.
That might seem ironic; but revolutions never proceed along a perfect path.
The Libyan revolution appears to be on dangerous shoals, as well, with armed factions and tribal rivalries getting in the way of consolidating a more or less democratic political format. It is the same situation in Iraq, with the frequent violent skirmishes between Sunnis and Shiites. The modern nations constituted after colonial power withdrew for the regions are thin political veneers unable to manage ethnic and sectarian communal tensions except by way of strongman rule.
Part of the reason the western powers are hesitant to fully support the anti-Assad forces in Syria is that the rebel ranks is composed of disparate and ideologically diverse groups, including Islamic fundamentalist movements directly traceable to Al Qaeda. It is not certain democratic peace will follow the overthrow of Assad. What will ensue, as we see in Iraq and Libya, is likely a sharpening of communal tensions and a long period of low-intensity civil war.
The Baathist movement that took power in Iraq and Syria, as well as influenced the strongman regimes in Egypt and Libya, was deeply influenced by the coup mounted by young Turkish colonels led by Ataturk early in the last century. Turkey today appears engrossed in a profound struggle over the nation’s future, centered on mass demonstrations in Istanbul challenging yet another Islamist government installed by way of free elections.
Unorganized
The resurgent protests at Tahrir Square shares many characteristics with the mass movements that recently broke out in Istanbul and the cities of Brazil, or even movements like Occupy Wall Street that spread like a contagion from New York to the major European cities. This is not so much for the conscious political demands they make but for the dynamics of the movements themselves.
All of these movements are largely inchoate. They seem to have burst forth almost spontaneously, using the social media as platforms for gathering support. They are not organized around well-evolved political orthodoxies nor led by traditional political parties. They draw their support largely from loose constituencies.
Because these social movements are basically unorganized, unlike the ideological formations in the previous century, they tend to dissipate almost as quickly as they occur. Although some, such as those in Egypt and Turkey, present clear political demands against the ruling regime, the movements are not driven by an explicit desire to take power.
Given their inchoate nature, these movements do not evolve around clear leaders. In fact, they tend to gather around multiple poles. They are flat rather than hierarchical. Because of these, as we saw when the Mubarak regime was scuttled, they are unready to take over the reins when a political vacuum happens.
Their weaknesses are also their strengths. Without a well-defined orthodoxy, they tend to be profoundly inclusive; but they likewise have no plan for governance. Because they are loose networks rather than tight, disciplined parties, they could grow very quickly — but face problems of political sustainability.
By their nature, these movements tend to collect every grievance there is as the protests gather steam. At some point, however, they lose a distinct identity and the reliable political allegiance that enables. The large protest movements tend to melt away as soon as one prominent demand appears to have been won, such as the expulsion of Mubarak.
We saw, in the case of Egypt, that inchoate movements of protests may manage to throw out a tyrant, but they are unable to win elections and therefore chart the nation’s political course. With rigid political parties of the traditional sort increasingly unable to hold on to the popular imagination, it seems inchoate protest movements will be the main vehicles for popular assertion.