P-Noy gov’t muddles GPH-NDFP peace talks

Because it wasn’t ready  or was unwilling  to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on social and economic reforms that would have segued to negotiating an accord on political and constitutional reforms, then to an agreement on cessation of hostilities, the P-Noy government has muddled the issues to justify unilaterally terminating the GPH-NDFP peace talks and blaming the NDFP to boot.

How have I arrived at this conclusion? Let’s briefly review what happened under the P-Noy government.

1. Pursuing his electoral-campaign promise to resume the peace talks (frozen over nine years by the Arroyo government) “on the basis of a comprehensive understanding of the root causes of the conflict, under clear policies that pave the way ahead…” President Aquino restarted the formal talks in February 2011 in Oslo, Norway.

2. The two sides agreed to:  a) reaffirm the12 accords signed since 1992; b) begin implementing the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by convening the Joint Monitoring Committee; and c) accelerate within 18 months the pace of negotiations on the remaining topics (cited above).

3. These three agreements were frozen, however, after negotiations on socio-economic reforms, set in June 2011, bogged down.

The cause: sharp differences on how to interpret and implement the reaffirmed agreements, particularly the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) against the arrest and detention of NDFP consultants and personnel involved in the peace talks.

4. The NDFP demanded the release of 14 detainees who it claimed were JASIG-protected.  While five were subsequently freed by the courts after dismissing the trumped-up charges against them, the government has refused to free the rest.

Worsening the disputes, the GPH panel made a written comment that The Hague Joint Declaration, which defines the framework and agenda of the peace talks, had become a “document of perpetual division.”  A point of contention is the provision that “no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations.”

5. Owing to the efforts of the Norwegian government’s third-party facilitator, Ambassador Ture Lundh, the two panels held bilateral discussions in June 2012, dubbed as “a non-meeting” because there was no agreed agenda.

The two sides issued a one-paragraph statement on June 15, stating: “The parties have agreed to continue meaningful discussions of concerns and issues raised by both sides on June 14 and 15, 2012 in Oslo, to pave the way for the resumption of the formal talks in the peace negotiations in order to resolve the armed conflict and attain a just and lasting peace.”

6.  In that “non-meeting” the NDFP urged the release of its detained consultants and JASIG-protected personnel.  It likewise urged the freeing of 356 political prisoners, in compliance with the CARHRIHL and the Hernandez doctrine repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court.

The doctrine says that those arrested for allegedly rising up in arms against the government should be charged with plain rebellion, not with common criminal offenses.  Alas, this doctrine has been violated since the Cory Aquino government up to the present administration of her president-son. 

 7.  Now the GPH panel accuses the NDFP of imposing such releases as a “precondition” for resuming the formal peace talks.

 However, the NDFP asserts that releasing the detainees is not a precondition but an obligation of the GPH under the JASIG, the CARHRIHL, and the February 2011 Joint Statement.

8. When the June talks were stalled, the NDFP sent P-Noy a written proposal for an immediate truce should he agree to work together in pursuing social, economic and political programs that uphold national independence and sovereignty.

The proposal was billed as a “special track,” aimed to accelerate the formal peace negotiations designated as the “regular track.” Initially P-Noy sent word, through a close adviser, that the proposal was “doable.”

Yet, in two discreet meetings held in The Hague, facilitated by Ambassador Lundh, P-Noy sent representatives who claimed to have no authority to sign anything with the NDFP special representatives, or to discuss the latter’s written proposals. Thus nothing palpable was achieved.

9. Teresita Deles, OPAPP head, recently issued a statement quoted by presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda, which states:

“In our discussion with our Norwegian facilitator last month… we mutually established that the NDF killed the special track that they had themselves proposed… We are not going back to the regular track which is going nowhere… We are always ready to resume talks under a new approach… We are currently undertaking discussions towards this new approach.”

10. In turn, Luis Jalandoni, NDFP panel chair, said he had inquired with Lundh and received a “quick response” that the GPH hadn’t informed the latter “formally or informally” about terminating the peace talks. Jalandoni charged the GPH with “acting irresponsibly” by “issuing bellicose statements.”

11. As regards socio-economic reforms, the NDFP had provided the GPH its draft comprehensive agreement as early as 1998, published it in book form, and updated it for the scheduled June 2011 negotiations.

Until now the GPH hasn’t come up with its own draft.

Should the GPH proceed to terminate the talks, the pertinent documents when made public will show how puerile are its responses to serious NDFP proposals.

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