The second placer

This case may be useful to some of the aspirants in the coming elections specifically on the issue of succession if the winner is disqualified. This is the case of Leo, a balikbayan.

Leo is a natural born Filipino, married and a native of a town in Pampanga who moved to the United States of America in 1983 where he subsequently became a naturalized citizen. Later on he decided to return to the country and applied for dual citizenship pursuant to RA 9225.

 On July 31, 2006, Leo’s application for dual citizenship was approved. So on the same date he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and then returned to the country on September 14, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, Leo applied for registration as a voter of his hometown but it was denied by the Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition for inclusion of his name in the list of voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). On February 9, 2007, the MTC reversed the ruling of ERB and ordered the inclusion of Leo in the list of voters of his hometown.

But on appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the MTC decision was reversed in a ruling dated March 1, 2007.

The RTC found that Leo was ineligible to vote since he failed to comply with the residency requirement citing the rule that naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of the domicile in the Philippines.

Leo however still appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals (CA).

While this appeal was still pending, or on March 28, 2007, Leo already filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for Mayor of his hometown stating therein that he was a registered voter. This prompted Bert, the only rival candidate vying for the same post, to file before the Comelec a Petition to deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Leo’s COC because of material misrepresentation as to his residency and consequently his qualification to vote.

The May 2007 elections were however already held without the CA resolving the appeal from the RTC decision on Leo’s residency, and the Comelec resolving Bert’s petition to cancel Leo’s COC. And in the said election, Leo won over Bert and was proclaimed as Mayor of their hometown. So he took his oath of office and assumed the duties thereof.

But on October 15, 2007, the Comelec finally cancelled Leo’s COC and nullified his proclamation.

Subsequently on August 19, 2008, the CA likewise dismissed Leo’s appeal and upheld the RTC ruling finding Leo ineligible to vote in the May, 2007 election. On December 24, 2008, the Supreme Court likewise upheld the Comelec ruling cancelling Leo’s COC and nullifying his proclamation.

Thereafter, Bert filed before the Comelec a motion for proclamation as the winning candidate for Mayor. But on June 17, 2009, the Comelec denied his motion pointing out that the rule on succession does not operate in Bert’s favor as second placer because Leo was not disqualified by final judgment before election day. Instead the Comelec ordered the incumbent Vice Mayor to assume office as Mayor after ordering Leo to vacate the same. Was the Comelec correct?

Yes. The second placer can be proclaimed and succeed as Mayor only if the winner has been disqualified as a candidate before the election. This is because under Section 6 the 1987 Electoral Reforms law a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for and votes cast for him shall not be counted. So actually under such a situation the second placer is the sole and only placer, second to none because the winner’s candidacy was legally non-existent.

In this case, the decision on Leo’s disqualification remained pending on election day resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates. It became final only more than a year after election. In such a case, the doctrine of the rejection of the second placer is applicable. Thus Bert as second placer cannot really be proclaimed as Mayor of their hometown in the May 2007 elections.

The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. To allow him to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part. Technically the second placer could receive just one vote, so it would absurd to proclaim him as the voters’ choice (Panlaqui vs. Comelec and Velasco, G.R. 188671, February 24, 2010).

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