Will GPH-NDFP peace talks resume?

Today, September 1, marks the 20th year of the signing of The Hague Joint Declaration between the Philippine Government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines. The agreement laid the basic principles and the four-point substantive agenda that have guided, since 1995, the on-and-off formal talks aimed at “resolving the armed conflict and attaining a just and lasting peace.”

But now the GPH-NDFP peace talks are in limbo, dampening the mood to celebrate what could have been a milestone in the long quest for peace.

Let us look back briefly to see what happened over 20 years:

• President Fidel Ramos (who, with Juan Ponce Enrile, had blocked the initial peace talks under the Cory Aquino government) initiated the exploratory talks that led to the signing of The Hague Declaration. Under his watch, the peace negotiations produced 10 signed agreements.

Among these are the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) and the landmark Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), the first major accord in the four-point agenda.

• President Joseph Estrada approved the CARHRIHL by signing it on August 8, 1998 (NDFP Chair Mariano Orosa had signed it on April 10 that year). But he later abandoned the peace talks and launched an “all-out war” both against the MILF and the CPP-NPA.

• Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo revived the talks in 2001 but suspended them soon after, and kept them suspended till the end of her nine-year administration. Instead she pursued, in vain, a two-part vicious counterinsurgency program dubbed as Oplan Bantay-Laya.

Still, the Arroyo government grudgingly signed two supplemental agreements after the controversial 2004 presidential elections.

• P-Noy, even before he became President, vowed to “revive the peace process on the basis of a comprehensive understanding of the root causes of the conflict, under clear policies that pave the way ahead…” He restarted the GPH-NDFP peace talks in February 2011.

The two sides reaffirmed the 12 previously signed accords, and agreed to begin implementing the CARHRIHL by convening its Joint Monitoring Committee. They even agreed to accelerate — within 18 months — the pace of the negotiations on the remaining topics of the agenda.

But as formal negotiations on social and economic reforms were to resume in June 2011, the talks bogged down, ironically, over disagreements on how to interpret and implement the agreements the two panels had signed and reaffirmed — particularly the JASIG.

The GPH panel virtually threw a monkey wrench into the talks by stating, in writing, that The Hague Joint Declaration has become a “document of perpetual division” between the parties.

Thus, after 14 months the prospects for resuming the talks remain uncertain.

Throughout that period, however, the Royal Norwegian government sustained efforts to resume the talks. Last June 14-15 the third-party facilitator, Ambassador Ture Lundh, succeeded in getting the two parties to hold bilateral discussions in Oslo.

Dubbed as “a non-meeting” because there was no agreed agenda, the discussions enabled each side to raise issues and concerns to the other side. On June 15, the participants signed a one-paragraph joint statement, which states:

“The Parties have agreed to continue meaningful discussions of concerns and issues raised by both sides on June 14 and 15, 2012 in Oslo, to pave the way for the resumption of the formal talks in the peace negotiations in order to resolve the armed conflict and attain a just and lasting peace.”

What did each side say to the other?

The NDFP team raised the following six concerns and issues, stressing that GPH compliance with these would open the way to resuming the formal negotiations on socio-economic reforms and convening the JMC:

1. Respect and comply with all bilateral agreements without qualification. Elaboration or amendments to these must be by mutual agreement.

2. Release all 356 political prisoners in accordance with the CARHRIHL and the Hernandez political offense doctrine (upheld several times by the Supreme Court).

3. Respect and comply with the JASIG by releasing 14 detained NDFP consultants and JASIG-protected personnel; conducting independent investigations on the extrajudicial killing of Sotero Llamas and the enforced disappearances of Leo Velasco, Prudencio Calubid, Rogelio Calubad and other NDFP consultants, family members and staff; and acknowledging GPH responsibility for “instigating” the raids on the NDFP office and the homes of Sison and NDFP personnel in August 2007.

4. Reconstruct the documents-of-identification list of NDFP consultants and staff, using encrypted photos.

5. Rectify the “terrorist listing” of the CPP, NPA and Sison by the US and other foreign governments.

6. Indemnify the victims of human rights violations under the Marcos regime as provided for in the CARHRIHL.

The GPH team, according to an OPAPP online posting, raised the following issues and concerns: 1) a ceasefire, or at least the “lowering of the level of violence,” especially against civilians and business establishments; and 2) objection to the NPA’s use of landmines in violation of the CARHRIHL.

No meeting of the minds there.

But beyond this problem is the glaring absence of P-Noy’s intervention. He hasn’t even spoken up. Unlike Ramos, who showed political will to overcome deadlocks and kept the negotiations moving forward.

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