The Truth Commission, in review

Not just a few were almost taken in by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.’s great dismay by the SC’s decision junking the ballyhooed Truth Commission.

 Firstly, it’s no secret that the Truth Commission was conceived as solely anti-GMA measure, no other else. And secondly, it’s no secret as well that of the 15-full membership of the Supreme Court, only latest SC appointee, Associate Justice Maria Lourdes Sereño, is the only member not appointed by then President Gloria M. Arroyo. Ergo, taking the human factor of gratitude, at the least, many are not surprised by where the wind blows in any crucial decision when a shred of legal doubt interlocks.

 Thirdly, considering that the Truth Commission, to reiterate, was targeted at the alleged official corruptions of the administration of GMA – and to no other previous administrations – the Supreme Court had conveniently and easily found the legal ground of thumbing it down as “unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause.” See, how comfortably expedient?

 Students of law on legal ethics find it disturbing for CJ Davide – if the Truth Commission were basically legal – to chair such investigative body against GMA, Davide’s boss who had appointed him to the august position in the United Nations. Even to ordinary citizens, it doesn’t sound ethical for a person to go against one’s former benefactor at the change of political fortunes.

 To recall, when CJ Davide retired from the Supreme Court, he categorically announced that he’d spend his retirement days to farming in Colawin, Argao, Cebu. But, when offered the United Nation’s position, he had no qualms in accepting it. Thus, it behooves him not to chair the Truth Commission whose main target was GMA, his immediate benefactor.

 To assail the SC for its decision may also be uncalled for under the special circumstances so obtaining, much less “losing faith and confidence in the Supreme Court.” Whether, indeed, the SC “is the protector of some people” is a matter of personal opinion which could have been suppressed. Again, from the standpoint of the students of law, the very essence of the Truth Commission’s concept of truth is overall tainted with bias at the inception, and biased in purpose.

 On the other hand, a certain Steve Y. Vispera, Esq., whose feature opinion found print in the inside pages of print media, amusingly opined that the “GMA-appointed justices’ resignation (is) a matter of honor.” His theory is that since “the recent testimonies and evidence of electoral fraud and cheating by the Arroyos and their cohorts to ensure the victory of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in the 2004 presidential elections – (and in the 2007 elections) – it behooves all the honorable justices of the Supreme Court appointed by GMA since 2004 to seriously reflect on the propriety and morality of their staying in and hanging on to their posts.”

 He finds anchor on the legal maxim of “the fruit of the poisoned tree” to suppress and strike down any evidence obtained illegally. Hence, since GMA’s elections in 2004 and 2007 were supposedly highly fraudulent, all her presidential actions thereafter, including appointments of SC justices are “fruits of the poisoned tree” and, without legal effect.

 That being so, the feature writer appears to argue that the present SC has no authority and jurisdiction to have declared the Truth Commission unconstitutional. But then, considering the continuity principle of official acts with legality, at least, within the ambit of de facto validity, unless declared later as invalid, remains legitimate, like, acts de jure. This includes all GMA’s official actions, say, appointment of the SC justices and other appointments she had signed, and all other official actuations, at least validly de facto with de jure effects, including Davide’s UN’s appointment.

And so, carping against the SC decision on the Truth Commission is without any momentous effect, as it is anchored on the unassailable ground of its “violation of the equal protection clause” which is likewise constitutionally unassailable.