Self incrimination (II)

The disaster in Japan delayed the writing of this sequel. Three weeks ago, we discussed the basic history and rationale of a person’s right against self incrimination under Section 17, Article III of our Constitution. Let us now tackle some of its real life applications.

Let’s say a murder has just been committed. After gathering evidence at the crime scene, the police decide to ask the neighbors some general questions about what transpired. They knock on the door of Mr. Cruz who is so remorseful that when he opens the door, he immediately blurts out that he is the killer. Mr. Cruz’s confession in this instance is admissible in Court since it was freely and voluntarily given.

Custodial investigation: But what if Mr. Cruz refused to talk but was instead invited to the police precinct to answer a few questions? On the way to the station, while inside the police car, the officers ask Mr. Cruz a few questions which afterwards leads to his confession of guilt. The latter would be inadmissible because, by focusing on Mr. Cruz, the scope of the officers’ investigation has been transformed from a general inquiry to a particular custodial interrogation. The latter occurs when an accused is placed under the custody of the police or is, in any other manner, deprived of his liberty and asked questions that are investigatory in nature. At this point, Mr. Cruz’s “Miranda” rights under Section 12 of Article III - taken from the US case of Miranda v. Arizona - are triggered. This is part and parcel of an accused’s right against self-incrimination since the right to remain silent was expanded to prevent officers from extorting a confession out of an accused while in police custody. Thus, we can see how one’s rights under Sections 12 and 17 compliment each other. Moreover, in the Philippines, this right may only be waived by an accused who knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives such right which has to be in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Accused vs. witness: Let’s assume our Mr. Cruz has not confessed and his case has proceeded to trial. He has the option to either testify- and risk cross-examination - or refuse to testify completely. However, an ordinary witness (who is not the accused) may be compelled to testify but can refuse to answer a particular question which can incriminate him. This is because an accused, under Section 14 of Article III, has a right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf. This exhibits a check and balance between different provisions of our Constitution. On the one hand, an accused has a right to seek assistance from a Court to compel a witness to testify on his behalf but at the same time, such witness may decline to answer specific questions posed to him which may be self-incriminatory.

No abuse: But a witness may not invoke the right in a cavalier fashion. For example, during the Senate blue ribbon committee hearings on corruption in the armed forces, the witnesses cannot refuse to answer substantially all of the questions asked by the Senators. In invoking the right, they can be compelled by the legislators to justify how and why the answer may incriminate them. 

Right to privacy: With regard to legislative hearings, an interesting legal issue is, instead of raising the right against self incrimination (which somehow connotes that something is being hidden), what if a witness refuses to answer a question on the basis that it would violate his right to privacy? This is precisely what happened during the hearings involving the bank accounts of Jose Pidal. Unfortunately for law students, the Senate blue ribbon committee at that time backed down, so much so that the Supreme Court was not given the opportunity to rule as to whether a private individual can invoke a right to privacy as opposed to the right against self incrimination in a legislative inquiry. Sayang..

Prohibition of testimonial compulsion: So if the Court cannot compel Mr. Cruz to testify against himself, what options does the State have in proving Mr. Cruz’s culpability? Well, the prosecutors can ask the Court to order the accused’s fingerprints taken and matched against those found in the crime scene. Or they could have his body subjected to a medical examination. Jurisprudence has held that such intrusions into the person of the accused, even though they may later point to his guilt, do not constitute an involuntary compulsion for the accused to testify against himself. As enunciated in the case of Holt v. US: “the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

However, one thing the Court cannot do is compel the accused to take dictation in his own handwriting. This was the ruling in the case of Beltran v. Samson where the Court reasoned that, “writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention.” Thus, if the evidence to be gathered would require an application of the accused’s attention or intelligence, then it will be inadmissible for violating an accused’s right against self-incrimination but if not, then it is fair game for so long as what is obtained is material to the case.

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Greetings: Today is the birthday of Federation of Philippine Industries (FPI) and CIIF Oil Mills Group President Jesus Arranza and caterer par excellence Michelle Dinglasan-Tomacruz. 

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“If you board the wrong train, it is no use running along the corridor in the other direction.” — Dietrich Bonhoeffer