Heaviest artillery in congressional arsenal

This is how Lord Bryce described the power of impeachment over a century ago as quoted by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Francisco vs. House of Representatives (415 SCRA 44). According to the former Chief Justice, this power is political in character. It is a “political proceeding and impeachable offenses are political crimes,” said former CJ Puno in the said case as he traced the historical roots of impeachment. Political offenses are “those which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of public trust”. They are denominated as “political because they relate chiefly to injuries done directly to society itself” (A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 65, 423-24)

Obviously, because of the political character of impeachment, some members of the House of Representatives are now resenting, to the point of defiance and threats of precipitating a constitutional crisis, the recent Supreme Court order in the case filed before it by Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez. The SC required them to maintain the status quo and refrain from taking further action on the two impeachment complaints filed against Gutierrez.

 The defiant members of the Lower House believe that since impeachment is political in nature, it involves purely political questions or “those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or the executive branch. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of a particular measure (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phils. 1101). Hence they think that as members of a co-equal branch of the government, their actions on the Gutierrez’ impeachment proceedings are not subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Indeed, as held in the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phils. 139) the power of judicial review or the power to review and set aside the acts of Congress and the Executive when they infringe the Constitution, is limited by the political question doctrine. Pursuant to this ruling, the judiciary is barred from passing upon issues the resolution of which has been given by the Constitution to the Legislative, the Executive or the people themselves. But is the question raised by Gutierrez in her petition before the SC a political question?

Gutierrez went to the SC because of the two complaints filed by former Akbayan Representative Risa Baraquel and the militant groups led by the Bayan Party list for betrayal of public trust and for culpable violation of the Constitution. According to her, the filing of the two complaints violates Section 3 (5) Article XI which provides that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”. This prohibition is also found in Rule V Section 14 of the House Rules of Procedure in impeachment proceedings. Obviously, the question here is whether the action of the Justice Committee of the Lower House in accepting the two complaints and finding them sufficient in form and substance already violates this Constitutional provision. In other words, when the first impeachment complaint was filed by Baraquel and accepted by the Justice Committee as sufficient in form and substance, was an impeachment proceeding already “initiated” such that when the second complaint was filed by Bayan and also accepted by the Justice Committee as sufficient in form and substance, there is already a violation of Section 3 (5) of the Constitution?

It is quite clear that this question presented before the SC involves a possible infringement of the Constitution by the Lower House and therefore, not strictly a political question which the Legislative Department alone should resolve. Apparently, there may be sufficient reason for the eight Justices of the SC to rule that it can intervene in the Gutierrez impeachment case and to issue that status quo ante order until the petition is decided on its merits.

Of course the action of the eight SC justices is still controversial precisely because the phrase “no impeachment proceeding may be initiated” is quite vague and can be interpreted differently as the three dissenting Justices did. But since majority of the Justices have seen fit to intervene, the Lower House should just abide by the status quo ante order and let the SC settle the doubt surrounding Section 3 (5) Article XI of the Constitution.

Actually, the doubt surrounding this section revolves on when the impeachment proceeding is “initiated”: is it upon the filing of a verified complaint for impeachment in the Lower House or is it upon the submission by the Justice Committee of its report with the corresponding resolution and the vote of at least one third of all the members of the House affirming or overriding said resolution? This is the issue that the SC has to decide on the merits; the crux of the controversy.

A closer scrutiny of the entire Section 3 Article XI regarding the exclusive power of the Lower House to initiate all cases of impeachment tends to favor the interpretation that it is upon the submission of the Committee report and the action of one third of the House membership when the impeachment proceeding is initiated. This view is supported by the fact that the provision barring the initiation of impeachment against the same official more than once within a period of one year is only on the 5th paragraph after the action of all the members of the House. Besides the Constitution uses the word impeachment proceeding, not impeachment complaint. So the Gutierrez petition may eventually be dismissed after all.

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