After listing issues, forming Noy's team

Filipinos foretasted President-elect Noynoy Aquino’s executive style in his televised press chat upon proclamation Wednesday. He said what’s on his mind. About his predecessor’s midnight appointees, he’d inventory them for now then fire when the time comes. About political rivals, he’d bury the hatchet. About his inaugural, he’ll definitely break tradition by taking oath not before the Chief Justice whose selection he doubts but the Justice whose dissent he supports, at the Quezon Memorial Circle instead of the Luneta. As for having to repeat himself, “I am not a jukebox.”

More importantly he’d “correctly identify” all the inherited problems from Gloria Arroyo. Three examples: burgeoning fiscal deficit, opacity of the bureaucracy, and unresolved corruption issues. Noynoy already has policy approaches. To the budget gap, new taxes would be last resort. For transparent governance, pass a Freedom of Information Act at once. To closure of graft cases, prosecute depending on evidence, for reconciliation with justice.

There are uncounted other problems, not just from Arroyo, but older structural wrongs and weaknesses. Noynoy spoke broadly of people’s expectation of reforms. Presumably he sees faults in the electoral, party, commerce, employment, and legislative systems, among others. Noynoy’s list of issues will be complete, to be sure. He said he’d start working on it right after inaugural on June 30.

He might have to advance his schedule. A search committee already is vetting cabinet and staff choices. Necessarily determining the final picks will be the perceived or expressed ability to solve the problems. The cabinet secretaries will then have to orient their departments with policies. Noynoy will have to form his team this early, if he is to hit the ground running.

Various Presidents of the Philippines, and of the USA from which the system was adopted, have applied five organizing alternatives:

Some reordered the structures to handle priorities. Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter tried unscrambling old agencies into new offices with broader powers. The book Outside and Inside the White House recounts Johnson’s plan for a Department of Commerce and Labor, Carter’s Department of Natural Resources, and Nixon’s four super-departments. In RP Fidel Ramos egged Congress, in vain, for a Department of Housing and Urban Development. Ferdinand Marcos created an unparalleled Ministry of Human Settlements, under wife Imelda.

Other presidents relied on super-secretaries. When the US Congress nixed his four super-departments, Nixon simply assigned four trusties to oversee major policy executions. His scheme of super-secretaries — half-White House and half-cabinet — never fully bloomed, as four months later the Watergate scandal blew. Gloria Arroyo did something similar, forming special units against smuggling and for revenue enhancement alongside the Bureaus of Customs and of Internal Revenue. The success of the former is unclear, if its true aim was to curb the illicit activities of a big man’s mistress.

A third organizing path is to convene the cabinet regularly. Dwight D. Eisenhower made systematic use of his secretaries as decision-making collective. He convened his cabinet 236 times to discuss 1,236 agenda items, resulting in 160 action steps. His cabinet, like most, consisted of disparate characters: former governors and legislators, religious and business leaders, academics and activists. Ike enjoyed hearing their differing takes on matters not even their expertise. Cory Aquino too depended on cabinet meetings.

A fourth route: designate a lead agency. In 1977 Carter embarked on an initiative to improve urban living, needing 12 departments and agencies to carry out. Six of these he placed under the direction of the Secretary of Housing, with two White House senior aides “to facilitate and support the efforts.” It failed when the other cabinet peers ignored meetings and action points. Cory Aquino divided her cabinet into six clusters, to handle the economy, defense, social services, and other concerns. Successor Ramos cut these down to four. Arroyo had only one — on security, headed by the foreign secretary, with those of defense, justice, and interior as members.

The last method, utilizing the senior staff, draws from Machiavelli. The Prince was to assign the best generals as viziers of conquered lands to extract mines and taxes. Courtiers were to be pampered at the Palace to do nothing but feed The Prince good ideas. Thus did Reagan, George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and Bush Jr. meet daily with select courtiers — the VP, White House chief of staff, Secretary of State, and National Security Adviser. Over orange juice at the White House gazebo, they pored over hot events and intelligence reports. The four officials then relayed to viziers (department and agency heads) the President’s decisions needing legislative liaison, cabinet execution, diplomatic offensive, and defense-military action. The closest a Philippine President came to this was Joseph Estrada’s assigning his executive secretary to do all the serious stuff, but then it’s not quite the same.

Actually there are two more ways to solve problems, from Outside and Inside the White House. And these have been done in Malacañang. One is to involve the First Lady, as Ramos did in the Pasig River cleanup and Estrada in indigent health care. Another is to assign the VP special tasks, as Cory Aquino, Ramos and Arroyo tapped Doy Laurel as foreign minister, Estrada as crime buster, and Noli de Castro as housing czar. Bachelor Noynoy has yet to decide if he’d marry while in office; he doesn’t even want to talk about it. But he’s considering giving VP Jojo Binay a cabinet post, and so with running mate Mar Roxas.

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“Little trials without God can break you. Great trials with God can make you.” Shafts of Light, Fr. Guido Arguelles, SJ

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