Dormant judgment

A final judgment that is not executed after the passage of five years becomes dormant. Another action for its revival is necessary before it can be executed. In this new action, can the propriety or correctness of the judgment sought to be revived be raised as an issue? This is answered in this case of Mona and her husband Abe against the spouses Vina and Ely.

Mona assisted by her husband Abe (plaintiff-spouses) filed the action for quieting of title with damages way back on February 28, 1977 against Vina and Ely (defendant-spouses) allegedly because the latter prevented them from entering and residing on a parcel of land located in their town which had been in the their actual, open, adverse and continuous possession for more than 50 years. After a delimitation of the land was made by the Sheriff as requested by plaintiff-spouses, their complaint was amended to conform to the items mentioned in the Sheriff’s report regarding the delimitation.

On June 1, 1984, the date set for the initial trial on the merits, only plaintiff-spouses and their counsel appeared. So the hearing was reset to August 15, 1984 with Vina and Ely being directed to secure the services of another counsel and be ready on that date. The order sent to Ely was returned unserved with the notation “party-deceased” while the order sent to Vina was returned with the notation “party in Manila”.

Thereafter the hearing was postponed twice because of the absence of defendant spouses and their counsel. It was resumed only on January 25, 1985 despite the motion for postponement of defendant-spouse’s counsel on the ground that his clients were sick. So the plaintiff-spouses submitted their exhibits and rested their case. Reception of evidence for defendant-spouses was set for June 3, 4, 5, 1985. But on June 3, 1985, only plaintiff-spouses and their counsel appeared. Thus upon their motion the defendant-spouses were deemed to have waived the right to present their evidence.

On August 7, 1987 after the lapse of two years, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision and decided it in favor of the plaintiff-spouses declaring them as lawful owners of the subject land and ordering the defendant-spouses, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof to plaintiff-spouses.

A motion for execution of the judgment was filed by plaintiff-spouses only in 1997 prompting the trial court to rule that the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Hence, on May 9, 1997, plaintiff Mona by that time already a widow filed a complaint seeking to revive and enforce the August 7, 1987 decision.

It turned out that Ely died on February 18, 1984 while Vina died on February 2, 1985 yet when the case was still pending in the trial court. So in answer to the complaint filed by their heirs who were impleaded, they alleged that the decision of the trial court dated August 7, 1987 was null and void and not binding on them because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them without any order of substitution of parties. Were they correct?

No. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed. It is done by means of petition of the prevailing party. It is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the first judgment debtor’s case nor of its propriety and correctness. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from the case of recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived by independent action is already final and executory.

Besides, it is the duty of the counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his clients. This rule operates on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of the name and address of his legal heirs.

The failure of the deceased defendant-spouses’ counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to inform the court of their death and their non-substitution will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. This case for quieting of title is an action involving real property and so it is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. The decision rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-interest (Saligumba et.al etc. vs. Palanog, G.R. 143365, December 4, 2008).

Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are now available. Call tel. 7249445.

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