Beyond review

Actions on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of courts do not prescribe and can be filed anytime. This is what the Director of Lands invoked in this particular case for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (RP).

The case involved a parcel of land containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters identified as Lot 2472 Cad.151 located in Cagayan. On June 2, 1930 upon petition of the spouses Tonyo and Toyang, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) issued Decree 381928 adjudicating said land to the spouses. Then on July 19, 1938, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 11585 was issued in their names, later cancelled and divided into two Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT): No. 2472-B consisting of 100,000 sq. m. in the name of Cagayan Province and No. 2472-B in the name of the heirs of Tonyo and Toyang.

But upon letter-petition dated May 19, 1994, of certain persons allegedly occupying and possessing a portion of the subject property and after proper investigation of a team created by the DENR, it was found that a portion of the land consisting of 2,640,000 (disputed portion) was supposedly still within the timberland area when the Decree and OCT was issued, and was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982.

Hence on June 10, 1998 or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, the RP filed a complaint for reversion, annulment of the decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930, the CFI had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputed portion of the subject property. The RP claimed that said portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree 381928 was issued, in effect admitting that the adjacent 4,407, 673 sq. m. outside the said portion were alienable and disposable in 1930. Will the petition prosper?

No. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, or over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable unless reserved for some public purpose or specifically declared as mineral or forest zone. RP has not alleged in its petition that the disputed portion has been declared as such in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps attached to the petition do not show that the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose.

The law prevailing when the Decree was issued in 1930 (Act 2874, Section 6) provides that the Governor General may classify lands of the public domain into alienable, timber or mineral lands. The petition has not alleged that the Governor General had declared the disputed portion timber or mineral land. Indeed said law (Section 8) recognizes that during the Spanish regime Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones or otherwise reserved for public purpose.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirements in Section 8, the land registration courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate them to private parties. As with this case, when the CFI issued a decree which was the basis for the issuance of an original certificate of title to the land, it had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that Tonyo and Toyang had proven that they were in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. The government which was a party in the original proceedings did not appeal the decision. Since the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision in 1930 is now final and beyond review.

Indeed, when the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, the spouses had already an existing right to the subject land. Thus even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral land of the public domain belong to the State, it still recognized that these lands were subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government (Section 1, Article XII) So the finality of the CFI’s decision is even recognized by the 1935 Constitution (Republic etc. vs. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. 155450, August 6, 2008).

Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are now available. Call Tel. 7249445.

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