Vote‑buying is an election offense that has two aspects, the electoral and the criminal, that can proceed independently of each other under different process and with different effects. This is illustrated in this case of Tino.
In the May 8, 1995 elections, Tino ran for Mayor of his town and won by more than 6,000 votes. But on petition of his opponent Ed he was not proclaimed and was disqualified by the Comelec in a summary proceeding from continuing as a candidate for Mayor in the said election because of vote-buying which was in violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Such ruling of the Comelec was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. 122258 in Blanco vs. Comelec.
In the 1998 elections Tino again ran for Mayor but a voter sought to disqualify him on the basis of the SC ruling in G.R. 122258. This time the Comelec did not disqualify him because according to the Comelec his previous disqualification attached only to the particular election on May 8, 1995.
In the 2001 elections, Tino once more ran for mayor. Again Ed sought to disqualify him based on the SC ruling in G.R. 122258. In a resolution dated May 11, 2001, the Comelec however disqualified him from running for Mayor under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) since, according to the COMELEC he was removed from office after the 1995 elections in an administrative case.
During the 2004 elections Tino again ran for mayor and ED again sought to disqualify him based on the SC ruling in G.R. 122258. So Tino just withdrew his certificate of candidacy and filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) asking for a judgment declaring him eligible to run for public office in succeeding elections. The RTC eventually granted his petition and declared him eligible to run for an elective office.
But when Tino ran for mayor in 2007 elections, and ED again sought his disqualification in view of the SC ruling in G.R. 122258 and the Comelec resolution dated May 11, 2001, the Comelec still disqualified him under Section 40 (b) of the LGC. The Comelec ruled that based on its findings contained in its May 11, 2001 resolution that Tino had been administratively removed from office after the May 8, 1995 elections which ruling was affirmed by the S.C. in G.R. 122258, Tino is disqualified from running unless he obtains a presidential pardon, amnesty or other form of executive clemency. Was the Comelec correct?
No. Disqualification of a candidate by the Comelec for vote buying under Section 68 of the OEC has its criminal and electoral aspects. In the electoral aspect, Comelec determines whether the offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office if he has been elected. Proceedings are summary and require only a preponderance of evidence. In the criminal aspect, the Comelec through its Law Department is the prosecutor which determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense and files the criminal charge before the proper court upon such finding of probable cause.
In the 1995 disqualification case of Tino, the Comelec only determined the electoral aspect of whether he should be disqualified as a candidate in a summary proceeding. It resolved to disqualify Tino as a candidate for Mayor in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (b) of the OEC. The SC in G.R. 122258 affirmed only the electoral aspect of the disqualification made by the Comelec. Hence Tino was disqualified from continuing as a candidate only in the May 8, 1995 elections.
No criminal complaint was filed against Tino for the election offense of vote-buying under Section 261 (a) of the OEC, neither was the accessory penalty of disqualification to hold office under Section 264 imposed on him by the proper court as a consequence of a conviction for the election offense. So the Comelec committed a grave abuse of discretion in pronouncing that his disqualification from being a candidate remains unless he has been given presidential pardon, amnesty or other form of executive clemency.
The Comelec also gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Tino was disqualified from running for mayor under Section 40 (b) of the LGC because he was removed from office as a result of an administrative case. Removal from office entails the ouster of an incumbent before expiration of his term. In G.R. 122258, Tino was disqualified as a candidate for mayor in the May 8, 1995 elections. The suspension of his proclamation was made permanent, so he never held office from which he could be removed (Blanco vs. Comelec and Alarilla, G.R. 180164, June 17, 2008).
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