Unlikely

Several years ago, during one of our normally intense discussions, a colleague at the Foundation for Economic Freedom broached a truly novel idea about how to solve the “Mindanao problem”: immediately declare the ARMM a special economic zone, lifting all restrictions on trade and investments.

It was a suggestion entirely from left field, completely out of the box. The group fell silent as we contemplated the proposition. None of us could come up with an argument against it.

None of us, just the same, thought it would get done.

Declaring the ARMM a special economic zone would transform the area into a funnel for trade and a magnet for investments. The economically liberated zone will likely lead the country in the pace of economic growth. It will lure the petrodollar-rich Islamic countries into the once-troubled area, creating a regional base for industries, trade and commercial activities.

The boom will have the side-effect of taking the wind out of the armed insurgency. It will reverse the migration pattern and lure back Muslim Filipinos from their own diaspora. It will set the conditions for explosive infrastructure development, food processing centers and efficient farming systems.

But the option will not be attractive to the local elites. The commercial frenzy will undermine their traditional communal dominance.

It will not be attractive to the leaders of the various armed movements in the area. They will lose their heroic role in the historical unfolding and become irrelevant. The armed units they have assembled to extract concessions from the national government will become useless.

I am not sure the instant option of economic liberation of the poorest region of the country will be attractive to the leaders of the Manila government as well as the oligarchy.

The Manila government, and all the do-gooder groups surrounding the “peace process” like cottage industries enveloping the manor, are trapped in an ancient paradigm. The problem is a political one and the solution can only be political.

The ancient paradigm is built around an equally ancient narrative. The Muslim areas have been the victims of “neglect” by the national government. The only solution to that “neglect” is an escalation of patronage by the patrimonial Manila-based state.

The traditional communal elites in Muslim Mindanao like that narrative. It puts them at the nexus of the flow of resources from the national government, scraping enough from it for themselves and their relatives.

The oligarchs will not likely relish the idea of converting a large region into a free economic zone. They will lose the political leverage they otherwise enjoy in cornering niches of the economy. In a free economy, they will have to compete with everybody else, giving up the privileges associated with political influence.

And so it was that the process of settling the conflict in Muslim Mindanao remained trapped in the old paradigm. All the negotiations revolved around such concepts as “autonomy” and “ancestral domains”, ceasefires and treaties, the shari’a and the recognition of the old feudal estates. This all very proper — and very likely fruitless as well.

The “negotiations” with the MILF, conducted entirely within the old paradigm, has now reached its climax. And its crisis point.

Brushing all the irresolvable issues under the rug — of who owns what specifically and in what juridical capacity — the national government and the MILF have now reached an understanding. Something vague called a “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” will be created, subsuming all claims to “ancestral domains.” Some protocol to that effect is due to be signed.

To realize that “juridical entity”, however, the Constitution will have to be amended so that substantial autonomy could be granted and the old organic act that is the basis for the ARMM be superseded. Never mind that a constitutional amendment to that effect will likely be rejected by the rest of the country.

Never mind that, even if that constitutional amendment is won in a plebiscite, the establishment of a “juridical entity” will likely have less capacity to solve the real problems of substantial underdevelopment that only happened to coincide with communal boundaries. That entity will only formalize, and therefore harden, cultural differentiation while at the same time further cutting off the Islamic communities from the mainstream of economic growth.

 It is highly unlikely, in the event that “juridical entity” become material fact, that it will immediately render itself superfluous by encouraging a zone of economic freedom that is the only way to rapidly develop a region left behind by history. The greater likelihood is that the new political entity will try to assert itself — which can only be by politicizing the local economy and discouraging the entry of new factors that will revolutionize wealth creation in the backward communities.

The “success” is not necessarily the solution. Trapped in the old view of things, the opposite is more likely true.

To sum up: the juridical entity now being celebrated will be running against the odds. No one else, apart from the entrenched leaders of the armed insurgency, wants this. And even if that entity is actually established, it is not the proper tool to bring immediate relief to the poor communities in the zone of war. The diaspora will continue.