Capacity

Jose Almonte’s book, We Must Level the Playing Field, dwells a lot on the paradox of national development we all must learn to deal with.

That paradox, stated simply, is this: the stronger our economy becomes, the greater the capacity for governance will be demanded of our state institutions.

In the analytical literature of political science, it is useful to use the spectrum of “weak states” and “strong states.” The terminology might be misleading to the uninitiated.

A state is “weak” if it is incapable of subordinating particularistic interests to the interests of the whole. Also if it is incapable of pursuing the long term interest against the clamor for instant gratification.

“Weak” states might come in some sort of democratic packaging or could be outright tyrannies. But, regardless of form, they share several characteristics. The most important of these is “regulatory capture.”

“Regulatory capture” is a condition where the regulated actually manages to control the regulator. When that happens, self-interest rather than public interest defines policy.

Drive through Edsa any day and you will see regulatory capture at play. The buses, whose number, volume of emissions and behavior in traffic ought to be regulated by a state agency are obviously impervious to regulation. It does not help the public interest that most of the bus companies are owned by retired police generals and the regulatory agency is controlled by one of them.

Banks are regulated. The bigger and stronger they are, the more complex banking becomes in the modern economy, the more important the stability of banks are in our economy, the greater the expertise required in regulating them.

Utilities like power and water impinge directly on the quality of daily life. If the utility companies are not regulated well, life for the ordinary citizen will be miserable. He could be overcharged. Or, the environment might be forced to pay for short-term conveniences.

A “strong” state is one whose institutions are capable of resisting particularistic interests in order to secure the interests of the whole and the well-being of future generations.

A “strong” state is immune to regulatory capture. It is capable of formulating policies that look at the strategic interests of the entire community, beyond the narrow interests of the noisiest constituencies or the oligarchs that might presently be influential in the way government behaves.

A “strong” state does not imply dictatorial institutions. In fact, a “strong” state emerges when there is accountable governance. Where policies are not decided behind closed doors or by way of discrete deals between the political authorities and the oligarchs (or, as often, the political authorities and the articulators of narrow, populist interests).

The strongest “strong” state is a functioning democracy where a well-informed public is capable of contemplating complex policy issues and determining which option works best for the greatest number.

Much of what ails our nation is due to the malaise of a “weak” state: the degradation of our environment; the absence of competition among our enterprises; the propensity of our politicians to choose the easier way out of fiscal difficulty by borrowing instead of taxing (and thereby passing the costs to future generations); the persistence of monopolies and the strength of oligarchic influence.

A lot of what ails us is due as well to the systematic distortion of otherwise valid sentiments.

Nationalism has been invoked to suppress competition and protect inefficient monopolies. Democracy has been invoked to force government to yield to the short-sighted demands of narrow constituencies.

The distortion has been inflicted not only by the rich monopolists. It has also been done by the poor, demanding dole-outs or clamoring for programs that conserve inefficiency and sacrifice efficiency.

For instance, the strong political influence of jeepney groups effectively prevented the early modernization of mass transport in the metropolitan area. More classically, the history of militant trade unionism in our country is closely woven with a highly protected economy that nourished a powerful oligarchy.

Unfortunately, in our political history, democracy has more usually been equated with the susceptibility of the state to populist demands. That is aggravated by our short electoral cycles and the culture of patronage associated with public support for the political elites.

It is such that advocacy for stronger public institutions and greater responsibility for long-run consequences of every policy option is so easily misrepresented as “anti-democratic.”

In his long career as a public servant, Jose Almonte has often been accused of espousing anti-democratic options. This is because he has consistently advocated improvement of state capacity as the key to our sustainable development.

Those who have succumbed to such misrepresentation might do well to read Almonte’s essays more carefully. They might be better educated on the unavoidable paradox of development: as markets and enterprises become strong, the public institutions that ensure the rule of law, fair play and sustainability into the long future must be even stronger.

A “strong” state is what all true patriots must advocate at this time.