The case involved the Chief of Legal Division of a Cabinet Department. Let’s call him Atty. Claro. He was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because he tape recorded a conversation he had with the Department Secretary without the latter’s knowledge and consent and then used it as evidence in a complaint and misconduct he himself lodged against the said Department Secretary. He also admitted having tape recorded the conversation of another co-employee without the latter’s knowledge and consent. In two letters, he even mentioned tape recordings he had made of his conversations with other people.
Thus after proper investigation the Ombudsman found him guilty of grave misconduct and suspended him for one year without pay. When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman, he went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO). But the CA dismissed his petition outright for being procedurally infirm. While his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal was still pending consideration by the CA, the Department Secretary already implemented the suspension order of the Ombudsman. So he filed a Petition for Prohibition with the Supreme Court (SC) questioning the implementation of the suspension order as premature considering that his petition in the CA was still pending as his motion for reconsideration was not yet resolved. Was he correct in filing the said petition?
No. Firstly, the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean that the parties have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court where they will file their petition. There is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Furthermore, Atty. Claro failed to consider that the same implementation of the suspension order which impelled him to abandon his motion for reconsideration in the CA also rendered this petition for prohibition academic. As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact that the suspension order has already been implemented as manifested by Atty. Claro himself. The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus this instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli (Montes vs. Court of Appeals etc. G.R. 143797, May 4, 2006).