The pitfalls of preemption

Last night security forces once again went on alert for bombing attacks ostensibly to be launched today by mutinous soldiers on "high-impact" targets in Metro Manila.

The objective is reportedly to show that the government is not in control.

There was no announcement from the usual administration officials about the purported threat, which was just as well.

Several days after Proclamation 1017 was lifted, the administration must be wondering why there is continuing public doubt about the coup plot allegedly hatched by a bizarre alliance of communist rebels, military officers and the chronic troublemakers from the political right.

Now the administration has launched a belated information blitz to enlighten doubters about the "clear and present danger" that prompted the declaration of a state of national emergency.

The administration says it had launched a preemptive strike against coup plotters. There is an ongoing debate on whether the strike was against enemies of the state or political enemies of an embattled administration.

President Arroyo obviously believes her administration is synonymous with the state. True to form, the pugnacious commander-in-chief warned yesterday she would not hesitate to declare a state of national emergency again "for the sake of freedom and democracy."

Her statement triggered a fresh round of hysterical warnings about creeping martial law, even as the administration continued churning out details of the supposed aborted coup.

Such are the perils of preemption. Even an administration with no credibility problem can find it difficult to defend strong measures taken to foil a coup that doesn’t get past the planning stage. The measures are a tougher sell for an administration whose legitimacy is in doubt.

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In dealing with threats to its survival, the administration can take cues from the war on terror. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, and subsequent deadly attacks in Bali, Madrid and London, people have come to accept measures that are meant to prevent terrorists from sowing further mayhem.

Counterterrorism forces in several countries have reported that scores of terrorist attacks have been foiled by preventive measures.

Even after horrific terrorist attacks, however, there are still disputes on how far governments should go in curbing civil liberties to prevent terrorism. There are debates on whether a crackdown on suspected Islamic militants can go overboard and prove counterproductive in the long run for the war on terror.

We are often told that the best defense is a good offense – the underlying principle behind preemptive strikes. People cannot sit around waiting for another 9/11.

But the world saw the pitfalls of the preemptive doctrine in the Bush administration’s attack on Iraq. Rather than drawing up a counterterrorism policy built around credible intelligence about a clear and present danger to the state, intelligence can be massaged to fit the policy. The Bush administration continues to feel the fallout from its preemptive strike.

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Any self-respecting government cannot sit around waiting for terrorists or coup plotters to strike.

But when the government has a serious credibility problem, it will have to think twice before implementing measures against civilians that are supposed to preempt a serious threat to the state.

There was minimal public resistance to measures taken by the government to deal with the riots that erupted on May 1, 2001 at the end of EDSA III, or the Oakwood mutiny in July 2003. The threats back then were clear and unfolding live on TV.

But after the EDSA III crowd had gone home, and after the Oakwood mutineers had marched back to their barracks, the government had hesitated to crack down on anyone who was not actually present at the two events.

This time, without any clear troop movements or a gathering of protesters that has the likelihood of reaching critical mass, military officers have been detained and questioned and arrest warrants are out for several members of the House of Representatives.

There are in fact people who believe the government’s story, who believe there are military officers foolish enough to forge an alliance with the communist movement. There are people who strongly believe any military officer who wants to poke his nose into politics should not only face disciplinary sanctions but also be purged from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

But over the past two decades, Filipinos have developed a high tolerance for mischief making, especially the type that seems to have little chance of success.

As the protests launched to coincide with the 20th anniversary of EDSA I have shown, there is little public support for yet another people power revolt or coup, no matter which groups have joined forces to topple yet another president.

On Feb. 24 there were text messages specifically urging priests and nuns to join Corazon Aquino at the afternoon rally in Makati; the call went unheeded. Some offices in the high-rises around the rally venue were visited by people who distributed ready-made confetti – no need to tear up telephone directories as people used to do with gusto – urging workers to strew the confetti from their office windows during the rally. There was no rain of confetti. The public snub of Marine Col. Ariel Querubin’s SOS for "protection" surely contributed to his tears when he bade his brigade goodbye days later.

Without public support, there was no chance of success for either a coup or a popular uprising. Filipinos are used to endless coup threats; coup plotting and rumormongering are national pastimes. What made the coup plot code-named Final Talk 2 more serious than the previous ones? Where was the clear and present danger?

The administration’s reaction merely reinforced perceptions that it had been itching to deal harshly with its political enemies since the start of its worst crisis last year.

Preemptive strikes can be useful, but they are open to abuse. This is especially true when the strike is launched by a beleaguered administration suffering from a serious credibility problem.