The widow, the orphaned children, and the close family circle bear the agony and life-wrenching misfortune over the irreplaceable loss of their loved one. Sadly, the soldier's death inexorably changes the course of the bereaved family life, particularly the future of the orphans.
For the government or the soldier's military unit, the soldier's demise in "line of duty" is nothing but part of cold stats. Medals, battle ribbons, rank promotion, ceremonial parades, etc. are all decorous rituals that get cheapened by their rote observance. To the deprived family, it could be as blandly blase and insipid or tasteless as yesterday's breakfast of military K-rations.
In recent NPA-AFP one-sided skirmishes - in Sumon, Tuburan, Cebu followed by Calinog, Iloilo, and then, in Tiaong, Quezon followed a few days ago in Compostela Valley - the AFP warriors were at the receiving end.
Pushing the memory button in retro some farther past, one recalls similar one-sided battles with the shoeless NPAs running roughshod over the booted AFP soldiers, such as, those in a mountain AFP outpost in mid-North Cebu, a couple somewhere in Negros Oriental, then some skirmishes in Bohol, in Samar, and in some places in Mindanao.
Invariably in these skirmishes - nay, ambuscades or surprise raids, etc. - the NPA appeared dictating or choosing the time, the place, and the tactical maneuver of engagement.
No wonder, the casualty stats stack heavy against the AFP, despite SOP guess work by unit commanders of NPA casualties based on "bloodstains"; that the AFP reinforcements are on "hot pursuit" operations; and, that the situation is still "under control".
Military veterans can reminisce with nostalgic pride the glorious exploits of then Col. Valeriano of the "Nenita" fame, of then DND Secretary Ramon Magsaysay - the Guy - with his "carrot and stick" strategy, and followed later by then Col. Ileto's elite "Scout Rangers". Their leadership by example practically broke the NPA backbone nationwide.
The foot soldiers then had been afforded the fighting chance by their pro-active military leadership.
It's horrendously ironical that the likes of Joma Sison, Jalandoni, Ka Roger Rosal, et al., without formal training in military science and tactics, have often outfoxed with impunity the AFP leadership who are honed professionally in the ABCs of war. Without disparaging them as "table tacticians", the cruel fact remains that they have not come up with innovative and/or effective counter-guerrilla tactics against the NPA.
They know that eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation is shunned by the NPA and, bombarding mountain lairs with no specific targets by the artillery's "Big Berthas" are a waste of ammo. Likewise, putting up military outposts in suspected enemy dens, have proved inutile, except as "sitting ducks" for rebel attacks.
A similar tactic in Vietnam - the "hamleting" - by the US forces didn't work out well. One effective American guerrilla counterfoil came with the jungle fighters, the "Montagnards" who, with the elements of surprise and secrecy, exacted many Vietcong casualties right in enemy havens.
Perhaps a review of their PMA subject on military history could jar the mindset of our military tacticians. Who knows that the exploits of the "Montagnards" in Vietnam, or of Ileto's "Scout Rangers", etc. would radically lead to new tactics and strategy against the wily NPA? At least, give our foot soldiers a fighting chance on a more or less even odds, instead of being massacred by landmines and ambuscades, and by surprise raids of isolated military outposts!
Instead of being just combat "reactive" like now, why not take a lesson for a change from Major General Jason Kamiya of the US forces in Afghanistan: "We're not sitting in our base waiting for them to attack us"?