Mr. Prado is the officer in charge of a National Trade School (ANTS) while Mr. Perlas is one of its faculty members. When Ms. Castro, another ANTS teacher requested Mr. Prado for a dialogue among teachers together with other school personnel, Mr. Prado directed Mr. Perlas to attend the meeting. On July 16, 1998, the day of the dialogue, Ms. Alonso a former teacher also attended upon invitation of Ms. Castro.Noting the presence of Ms. Alonso, Mr. Prado stated openly that he will not start the meeting if there are "outsiders". So Ms. Alonso was asked to step out of the room.
Because of this incident, Ms. Alonso charged Mr. Prado before the Ombudsman with misconduct and with violation of Article 131 of the Revised Penal Code (Prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meeting). In his counter-affidavit, Mr. Prado alleged among others that: (1) the misconduct charge against him is a "rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of an administrative case pending with the DECS which Ms. Alonso and Ms. Castro earlier filed against him; and (2) Ms. Castro had no authority to invite to the meeting a non-employee of ANTS like Ms. Alonso considering that he (Prado) was the one who called the meeting. Mr. Perlas also submitted a sworn statement confirming that Prado and not Castro called the meeting. On the basis of this counter-affidavit of Prado and sworn statement of Perlas, the Ombudsman dismissed both charges filed by Alonso against Prado.
Alonso then subsequently charged both Prado and Perlas with Perjury contending that they perjured themselves when they made those statements in their affidavits filed before the Ombudsman because: (1) the complaint she and Castro filed against Prado before the Civil Service Commission and later endorsed to the DECS was not the same as her complaint of misconduct before the Ombudsman and (2) it was Ms. Castro and not Prado who called the July 16, 1998 dialogue or meeting. Were Prado and Perlas guilty of perjury?
No. To hold Prado and Perlas liable, there must be evidence that the assailed statements in the misconduct case before the Ombudsman were the subject of the inquiry. Admittedly, some inference is possible that the basis of Alonso’s misconduct complaint is that Prado prevented her from taking part in the July 16, 1998 meeting. But the element of materiality must be established by evidence and not left to inference. At any rate, Alonso’s complaint for perjury will still not prosper because Prado’s statement – that the misconduct complaint is significantly the same as Alonso’s and Castro’s complaint against Prado before the DECS is immaterial to the inferred issue. Besides, it was not shown why this is false.
The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense. Prado’s statement that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate falsehood. While it was Castro and some personnel who requested a dialogue with Prado, it was Prado’s consent to their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus Prado’s statement is not false, much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events leading to the holding of the meeting. Perlas’ statement on the other hand was a mere reiteration of what Prado told him. So he could not be held liable for making a false and malicious statement (Acuña vs. Ombudsman et. al. G.R. 144692, January 31, 2005).