Politics and the rule of law
August 19, 2005 | 12:00am
Just as politics Philippine style is incompatible with the truth so is it with the "rule of law". Four past presidents of a lawyers group have just demonstrated this truism. In their attempt to uphold the rule of law on the ongoing impeachment process, politics reared its ugly head as clearly seen in their supercilious regard of the amended impeachment complaint as a breach of the impeachment rule barring the initiation of more than one impeachment proceeding in a year. The political color in this stand, that appeared in a full page newspaper ad, becomes more glaring in the light of the move by the ruling majority in the lower house towards the same direction. The existence of a hidden baton wielder orchestrating every move is very apparent.
The lack of a definite impeachment rule on amendment of a complaint necessitates the suppletory application of the existing judicial rules. Under these rules, pleadings (like complaints) may be amended by "adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner" (Section 1, Rule 10, Rules of Court). And, "an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends" except that "admissions in the superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived" (Section 8 idem). This is the rule of law, clear and simple. So when the original Lozano complaint was amended by correcting mistaken or inadequate allegations or adding new allegations and party signatories, the amended complaint superseded the original one. The superseded complaint should not have been referred to the Secretary General and the Justice Committee anymore. Its referral only betrays a clear attempt to derail the more substantial and stronger amended complaint through the one-year bar rule.
Equally flawed is the contention that since the original Lozano complaint has already been answered, permission of Congress (should be lower house) is required before filing the Amended Complaint. This argument conveniently glosses over the fact that said complaint need not be answered yet until after it has been referred to the Secretary General who will then require the adverse party to file its answer. The filing of an answer even before being required to do so is clearly another ploy to subvert the filing of an amended complaint more so in the light of the glaring fact that it was done when moves were already afoot to amend the original complaint.
More erroneous is the use of the Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives (415 SCRA, 44) ruling in contending that the Amended Complaint violates the constitutional one year bar rule on the initiation of another impeachment proceeding. The facts in said case are entirely different. Records in Francisco, Jr. show that the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was filed by former President Estrada on June 2, 2003. It was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 which dismissed the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. A day after such dismissal or on October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed by Congressmen Teodoro and Fuentebella. Thus the ruling refers quite clearly to a situation where the first impeachment complaint was already acted upon and dismissed by the House Committee when the second impeachment complaint was filed. In the present case neither the original Lozano Complaint nor its amendment nor any other impeachment complaint filed in the Lower House has been acted upon by its Justice Committee. In fact all the impeachment complaints were referred by the Speaker to the Justice Committee on the same day, July 25, 2005. The one year bar rule therefore finds no application here as no impeachment proceeding has been "initiated" yet.
The Francisco, Jr. ruling as to when an impeachment proceeding is "initiated" applies only to cases with the same factual background. To be sure, its conclusion that "initiation" takes place by the act of filing and referral of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice, is not an absolutely undisputable or a completely flawless precedent setting doctrine. "Initiating" an impeachment is the sole function of the House while the "filing" of an impeachment complaint can be done by an individual, a Congressman or any citizen endorsed by a Congressman. So an impeachment proceeding is actually initiated or began not from the time an impeachment complaint is filed but from the time the House through the Justice Committee begins processing any and all complaints referred to it until its resolution rejecting or upholding the complaint/s. In other words, in the present case, all the complaints filed and referred to the Justice Committee can be processed or consolidated without violating the one year bar rule; if the rule of law will really be applied.
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The lack of a definite impeachment rule on amendment of a complaint necessitates the suppletory application of the existing judicial rules. Under these rules, pleadings (like complaints) may be amended by "adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner" (Section 1, Rule 10, Rules of Court). And, "an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends" except that "admissions in the superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived" (Section 8 idem). This is the rule of law, clear and simple. So when the original Lozano complaint was amended by correcting mistaken or inadequate allegations or adding new allegations and party signatories, the amended complaint superseded the original one. The superseded complaint should not have been referred to the Secretary General and the Justice Committee anymore. Its referral only betrays a clear attempt to derail the more substantial and stronger amended complaint through the one-year bar rule.
Equally flawed is the contention that since the original Lozano complaint has already been answered, permission of Congress (should be lower house) is required before filing the Amended Complaint. This argument conveniently glosses over the fact that said complaint need not be answered yet until after it has been referred to the Secretary General who will then require the adverse party to file its answer. The filing of an answer even before being required to do so is clearly another ploy to subvert the filing of an amended complaint more so in the light of the glaring fact that it was done when moves were already afoot to amend the original complaint.
More erroneous is the use of the Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives (415 SCRA, 44) ruling in contending that the Amended Complaint violates the constitutional one year bar rule on the initiation of another impeachment proceeding. The facts in said case are entirely different. Records in Francisco, Jr. show that the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was filed by former President Estrada on June 2, 2003. It was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 which dismissed the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. A day after such dismissal or on October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed by Congressmen Teodoro and Fuentebella. Thus the ruling refers quite clearly to a situation where the first impeachment complaint was already acted upon and dismissed by the House Committee when the second impeachment complaint was filed. In the present case neither the original Lozano Complaint nor its amendment nor any other impeachment complaint filed in the Lower House has been acted upon by its Justice Committee. In fact all the impeachment complaints were referred by the Speaker to the Justice Committee on the same day, July 25, 2005. The one year bar rule therefore finds no application here as no impeachment proceeding has been "initiated" yet.
The Francisco, Jr. ruling as to when an impeachment proceeding is "initiated" applies only to cases with the same factual background. To be sure, its conclusion that "initiation" takes place by the act of filing and referral of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice, is not an absolutely undisputable or a completely flawless precedent setting doctrine. "Initiating" an impeachment is the sole function of the House while the "filing" of an impeachment complaint can be done by an individual, a Congressman or any citizen endorsed by a Congressman. So an impeachment proceeding is actually initiated or began not from the time an impeachment complaint is filed but from the time the House through the Justice Committee begins processing any and all complaints referred to it until its resolution rejecting or upholding the complaint/s. In other words, in the present case, all the complaints filed and referred to the Justice Committee can be processed or consolidated without violating the one year bar rule; if the rule of law will really be applied.
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