Lino had been a faculty member of a private educational institution (DCCI) for more than 20 years. He was the president of the union of the faculty and staff members of the school with whom it had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). When DCCI and the union failed to conclude another CBA upon the expiration of the existing one, Lino’s union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the ground of refusal to bargain. Subsequently, without submitting the required results of the strike vote obtained from the union members, the union staged a strike in the school premises.
Under the law (Art. 263 Labor Code), for a strike to be valid, there must be; (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership obtained by secret ballet in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting seven days before the intended strike.
Thus upon complaint of DCCI filed with the DOLE, the strike was declared illegal by the labor arbiter for failure to comply with the strike vote requirements, and the union officers headed by Lino were declared to have lost their employment status effective on the date of the decision (October 28, 1994). The union appealed the decision tot he NLRC so the officers continued working in the school by virtue of an earlier agreement that the strikers could resume service without prejudice to the outcome of the case.
The labor arbiter’s decision was affirmed by the NLRC on December 19, 1995 with an additional ground that Lino’s union had no legal personality to hold a strike as it was not a legitimate labor organization. Lino and his group then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the NLRC decision. In the meantime, Lino turned 60 years old and retired on March 1, 1996, rendering his dismissal moot and academic. Thereafter, on March 25, 2001, the CA affirmed in toto the NLRC ruling. Later on the supreme Court also requirement. With such ruling, Lino lost his employment status effective as of the date of the decision of the labor arbiter on October 28, 1994. So, was he still entitled to the payment of retirement benefits considering that legally he was already considered dismissed for cause he reached retirement age on March 1, 1996?
The Supreme Court said that while an employee dismissed for cause is not entitled to financial assistance, equity considerations provide an exception. Equity is justice outside law, being ethical rather juridical and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is law.
Although meriting termination of employment, Lino’s infraction is not so reprehensible nor unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard of his long years of service. Moreover, he has no previous derogatory records. Weighed in the scales of justice, conscience and reason tip in favor of granting financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after long years of service. Social and compassionate justice dictate that Lino be awarded financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after long years of service. Social and compassionate justice dictate that Lino be awarded financial assistance equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service computed from his date of employment up to October 28, 1994 when he was declared to have lost his employment status. Indeed equities of this case should be accorded due weight because labor law determinations are not only secundum rationem (according to reason) but also secundum caritatem (according to a charitable heart). (Pinero etc. vs. NLRC et. al. G.R. No. 149610 August 20, 2004).