Marta is a spinster who owned a four-door apartment. On February 1, 1976, she leased Apartment 104-D to Virgie for a monthly rental of P850.00 under a contract of lease with a fixed period of one year or until January 31, 1977. The contract was not renewed anymore upon its expiration but Virgie remained in the premises paying Marta the monthly rent of P850.
Virgie continued occupying the premises and religiously paying the monthly rent for over twelve more years with the acquiescence of Marta. But on December 20, 1989, she received a letter from Marta’s lawyer informing her of Marta’s desire to repossess the apartment she was occupying. In said letter the lawyer gave her notice that Marta was terminating the lease effective December 31, 1989 and at the same time demanded that she vacate and surrender the premises within five (5) days from notice.
In reply, Virgie claimed that Marta could not possibly need the apartment for her use since Marta was a spinster and already had a residential house. Besides the 5-day notice given her was short. So Virgie did not heed Marta’s demand. But when she offered to pay the monthly rents thereafter, Marta refused to accept them. Thus Virgie instead deposited the amounts in the Philippine Savings Bank, Central Market Branch, in the name of, and with notice to Marta under account no. 2346510-31.
Nevertheless, on March 2, 1990, Marta wrote Virgie again claiming that the latter had not paid the rents from January to March 1990. She thus demanded the payment of the arrears in the sum of P2,250 and the return of the premises. When Virgie refused, Marta filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC alleging that Virgie had failed and refused to pay the monthly rent and to vacate the premises. Despite Virgie’s defense that she tendered payment of the rents which Marta refused to accept, the MTC still decided in favor of Marta ordering Virgie to vacate the premises for non-payment of rentals and to pay the rentals in arrears. The court also said that the terms of the lease have already expired because the contract of lease between Marta and Virgie was impliedly renewed on a month to month basis and that it is one with a definite term so that the lessor may judicially eject the tenant at the end of each month.
Was the MTC correct?
The MTC is correct in ruling that Marta can judicially eject Virgie. Not because of non-payment of rentals but only because the lease can be validly terminated by Marta at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect made on Virgie.
The deposit of the amounts of the monthly rents made by Virgie with the bank in the name of, and with notice to Marta following the latter’s repeated refusal to accept Virgie’s tender of monthly rentals is expressly sanctioned as a sufficient and valid alternative to judicial consignation under Section 5(b) of B.P. 25, as amended. So the MTC is not correct in ruling that non-payment of rentals is a valid cause in ejecting Virgie and in ordering Virgie to pay the rentals on arrears until she vacates the premises since the same was already validly consignated with the bank.
But Virgie can be ejected on the ground of expiration of the term of the lease. When the lease contract which initially contained a one year term expired on January 31, 1977, Virgie continued in the possession of the property for several more years paying monthly rentals with the acquiescence of Marta. This situation gave rise to an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract but at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect on the lessee Virgie since the rentals are paid monthly. As held in Dimaculangan vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 393), when the rentals are paid monthly, a lease is deemed to be for a definite period expiring at the end of every monthly period" The lessor is thus granted the right to eject the lessee, being an excepted case under the Rent Control Law, after prior notice of such termination and demand to vacate the leased premises, as was done by Marta in this case (Inductivo vs. Court of Appeals G.R. 108196, January 19, 1994).