National ID system

Congress should also draw up a bill that is narrow enough to assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy even with the use of the latest technology. According to the SC, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether his expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. However other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings, and practices of a particular activity may serve to create or diminish this expectation. As technology advances the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.

The objectionable features of A.O.308 should not be duplicated by Congress particularly its section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs". According to the SC, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It has now evolved into the use of his physiological characteristics like finger tip scanning, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features; or his behavioral characteristic which includes voice print, signature and key stroke. The A.O. does not state what specific physiological or behavioral characteristics and what biometrics technology shall be used to identify people, leaving a "banquet of options" available to its implementors. Hence there is danger of abuse that threatens the right to privacy. Besides, the purposes of the data encoding are not limited to identification alone. So it gives the government the "roving authority" to store and retrieve information about an individual for other purposes through his PRN. And if the individual must present his PRN every time he deals with the government, there is a better chance of building a huge and formidable information base through electronic linkage of the files. This "vast reservoir’ of personal information is a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist" And even if the computer data are limited to the name, address and other basic personal information, the A.O. does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. There are also no controls to guard against leakage of information so that when the access code of a system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.

All told, the SC said that A.O.308 falls short of assuring that the personal information gathered concerning our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. It may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable sear-ches and seizures. Considering that the individual lacks control over what could be placed or read on his ID much less verify the correctness of the data encoded, the possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated, the SC concluded.

So sufficient parameters have already been established by the SC in the previous case (Ople vs. Torres, Supra) within which Congress must work in enacting a valid law on the national ID system. While the SC was sharply divided on this issue of the right to privacy, the bill will be less controversial if Congress will consider the foregoing observations of the majority of the SC justices.

But over and above its intrinsic validity, Congress must ensure that the law can be strictly enforced and properly implemented. So many good laws with laudable objectives have not achieved their desired results either because they encounter hitches that delay implementation, like the Clean Air Act; or they have loopholes where "fixers" enter to place the integrity of the system in doubt. A national ID system looks formidable as a tool in cracking down on criminality and terrorism. Until we are confronted with sad reality that we can not even get rid of fake passports, fake land titles, fake birth certificates, fake marriage licenses, fake driver’s licenses and fake license car plates in our midst.

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