Principled stand for Balikatan 2002 in Basilan

President Gloria might have saved herself from troubles arising from her decision to allow US troops in Basilan had she tackled the issue differently. It would have been far wiser had she enunciated a principled stand for Balikatan 2002 through a policy statement from her party, the Centrist Democrats. As it is Balikatan 2002 is beginning to look more and more like her personal crusade which should not be the case. There is a wide range of implications, both political and economic in allowing Balikatan 2002 in Basilan.

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Sound bites cannot encompass all the issues involved in this decision. But it is not too late to wrest the moral high ground. Moreover here is a good opportunity to rev up the cause of party politics. That means she must line up the Centrist Democrats solidly behind a collective party decision led by her. She must be able to demonstrate that Balikatan 2002 is consistent with party ideology. That would have reined in her party-mates and create a powerhouse behind government with the wisdom of the likes of Fidel V. Ramos and Teofisto Guingona, the fiscalizing skills of a Joker Arroyo and the coalition building talent of Jose de Venecia. The latter can also act, as it were, in British parliamentary parlance, as party whip, a role he has already been playing since the inception of the Arroyo adminis-tration but whose importance is not adequately under-stood by the public. Having done that, she can truly say if you are not behind Balikatan 2002, you are not Centrist Democrat.

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Those who cannot accept the party decision for whatever reason are free to leave the party and join the Opposition which seems to have taken the lead against Balikatan 2002 although it is being obscured in natio-nalistic rhetoric. The strategy is to blast that open and show it up for what it is: blatant opportunism. Then whatever taray she de-monstrates is quite appropriate. Politicians who hook up to the party in power, then undermine its decisions have no place in New Politics. But President Arroyo must decide now whether she will continue with practices that reinforce perso-nality centered politics or break into issue-oriented party politics.

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It is good that Vice President and Foreign Affairs Secretary Teofisto Guingona is reported to have come around to agree substantially with her decision on Balikatan 2002 but with certain safeguard to Philip-pine sovereignty. Whatever the details of the terms of reference that will be finally signed, these can be or at least ought to be cobbled within a party mechanism instead of individual public statements from party members who project a divided house and weakens government.

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Handled correctly, Balikatan 2002 should give the Arroyo government the necessary platform for a take-off into New Politics. Her decision may be popular as all surveys have verified but Mrs. Arroyo would do well not to abuse this popularity as a license to say and do whatever pleases her. There may be sympathy for her decision but she is still obliged to seek out those who differ with her and this she can be best do through the spirit of continuing dialogue and by drawing on a wider circle of international experts who have been struggling to come up with a coherent response to post Cold-War inter-national politics and the crisis from September 11. That is mature leadership.

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That international opinion consistent with Centrist Demo-cracy is available in a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect which was prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The members of the Commission are Gareth Evans, Mahamed Sahnoun, Gisele Cote-Harper, Lee Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyruil Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos, Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Steing and Ramesh Thakur.

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Citizen Fidel V. Ramos sent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo a copy of this report last December 22. Although the Commission is careful to emphasize that the report does not deal directly with September 11 the report touches on difficult concepts that would have been helpful guidelines for the Arroyo government on procedure and action on Balikatan 2002.

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Policy challenge. The report is directly concerned with the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention: the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state." It acknowledges that the issue of intervention for human protection is one of the most controversial and difficult of all international relations questions: With the end of the Cold War, it became a live issue as never before . Many calls for interventions have been made over the last decade – some of them answered and some of them ignored. But there continues to be disagreement as to whether if there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised and under whose authority.

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GMA could have learned a few tips from this continuing debate and policy challenge for governments worldwide. The first hurdle as far as the Philippines is concerned is how to classify the Abu Sayyaf problem in Mindanao: Is it just a domestic problem or is it international given Abu Sayyaf’s links with Al-Qaeda and that the kidnap victims are Americans? If it is the latter then "The Responsibility to Protect" report may be relevant.

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The report and the events of 11 September 2001. The Commission’s report was largely completed before the appalling events of September 11 but this is what it had to say:

While for the reasons stated we have not except in passing addressed in the body of our report the issues raised by the 11 September attacks there are aspects of our report which do have some relevance to the issues with which the international community has been grappling in the aftermath of those attacks. In particular, the precautionary principles outlined in our report do seem to be relevant to military operations, both multilateral and unilateral against the scourge of terrorism. We have no difficulty in principle with focused military action being taken against international terrorists and those who harbour them. But military power should always be exercised in a principled way and the principles of right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects outlined in our report are on the face of all applicable to such action.

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An evolving challenge. The bottomline is that decisions on how to respond to terrorism are necessarily tentative given the newness of the phenomenon in world politics. It is wise not to have frozen positions. For example, an ancillary concern for the Philippine Centrist Democrats is how the CDI as a body would view current developments now that the European Union is poised to depart from American policy in Palestine. Decisions would be more difficult as nations align their national interests with the collective policy of the CDI. It must be borne in mind that the most influential members of the CDI are European political parties. It is already well known that the Europeans are not comfortable with the black and white rhetoric of President George Bush although his actions are still popular with the European public. Happily the national chairman of the Centrist Democrats in the Philippines is Speaker Jose de Venecia who is also the CDI vice-president for Asia. He should be able to keep pace with international developments and put the Arroyo government on track.

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