Rethinking CAFGU - My Viewpoint

The proposal to reactivate 35,000 Civilian Armed Forces and Geographical Units (CAFGU) cannot be dismissed solely on the basis of possible human rights abuses that might be committed by these militiamen. Yes, their predecessors, the Barrio Self-Defense Units and the Civilian Home Defense Force, both achieved notoriety during the 1960's up to the mid-1980's. And, yes, Norberto Manero, Jr. the killer of Fr. Tullio Favali, was a local commander of the CHDF. But it oversimplifies the debate to focus only on the abuses of paramilitary forces as well as on their misuse by military and local officials.

In the fight against a stubborn insurgency, there can be little argument that a local militia constitutes valuable augmentation of regular police and military forces. This is particularly true when both the military, with its forces trimmed down to about 130,000 soldiers, and the police, with just a little over 100,000 personnel, are so obviously undermanned. The Philippine National Police has not been able to take over the fight against domestic insurgency, largely because it is still preoccupied with the war against crime as well as with cleansing its own ranks. The military is already engaged on numerous fronts. It is up against Muslim rebels in the South, and the New People's Army in several provinces.

Neither the military nor the police can be everywhere at the same time. But they are expected to handle relatively minor incidents as well as large-scale assaults. From this point of view, there is no question that help is needed. If competent, mobile and effective paramilitary units could be organized on the local level, the AFP would be better able to marshal its limited resources and focus on its more strategically significant responsibilities. In this sense, I agree with Senator Pong Biazon that the mobilization of 35,000 militiamen may be an important, even essential, tool in the counterinsurgency effort.

But there is widespread, and largely justified, concern that these CAFGUs may run out of control. Ironically, if they become part of the problem rather than the solution, their reactivation might eventually result in a bigger insurgency problem. As we saw during the heyday of the BSDU and CHDF, victims of CAFGU abuses and misdeeds could become fertile ground for recruitment by rebel groups. The civilian populace could turn against the government. If that were to be the case, the medicine, i.e. CAFGU, could become the poison that eventually kills the body politic.

Senator Biazon clarifies that unlike the BSDU and CHDF, the CAFGU is subject to military law and the Articles of War. In answer to those who propose the recruitment of more regular soldiers, he makes the valid point that 30,000 more soldiers would cost the country P7 to P10 billion in training costs, salaries and present and future benefits. In contrast, 30,000 CAFGUs would cost only about P1 billion.

Rep. Joker Arroyo disputes this, arguing that the Aquino-era Executive Order Biazon refers to only makes reservists subject to military law, not civilian recruits. Besides, he says, the proposed salary level of new CAFGUs of about P1,800 a month is hardly a living wage. What he means, I suppose, is that a man who can't live on what we pay him, but who is armed and belongs to an organized band of men similarly situated, is a dangerous proposition.

Defense Secretary Orly Mercado assures that the recruitment, training and control of CAFGUs would follow strict procedures to ensure conformity with high standards of performance and conduct. Discipline, he says, will be a high priority.

This is the dilemma. The fight against insurgency cannot be left entirely to the military and police. Local communities must be involved. But human rights groups have reason to be skeptical, on the basis of our experience with paramilitary forces. There is serious doubt about whether local militias can ever be controlled, or whether local military commanders themselves might use those units for their own purposes. In the recent example of East Timor, local militiamen ran riot against independence advocates. Today, Indonesian military officers who were in command of Dili are facing criminal charges for their negligence or outright complicity.

Assuring the people that a new and reoriented CAFGU will be different and that it will not turn out to be an enemy of the people will be a tough job. But, as I see it, the PNP and AFP will just have to meet that challenge. Frankly, while I too have concerns about CAFGU, I don't see too many other options left for us.