A monster in the making

We want peace and order restored nationwide. But are we so desperate that we want to revive one of the most notorious units of the Marcos dictatorship? Recent reports said President Estrada has agreed to reactivate paramilitary units to augment government troops fighting communist and Muslim secessionist rebels. An initial 35,000 men will be recruited for the Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units or CAFGU.

What sort of people are recruited for militia work? Usually those who can't get into the regular armed forces or national police. Naturally, the militia's educational requirements and other qualifications are lower than those for regular government troops. There is a public impression that militiamen are people who simply love to brandish firearms, who think power comes from the barrel of a gun. The CAFGU's predecessor, the Civilian Home Defense Force, was organized by the Marcos regime to fight the communist insurgency. But it didn't take long for the CHDF to gain notoriety for bullying and terrorism -- not of insurgents but of civilians.

Militias under the Alsa Masa rid Davao of communist rebels. But the human rights abuses committed in this effort merely fueled the insurgency in other parts of the country. The communist movement reached its peak during the Marcos regime, at the height of paramilitary activities and human rights abuses perpetrated by government troops. The most notorious CHDF member, Norberto Manero Jr., continues to strike fear into the hearts of people he terrorized more than a decade ago.

A budget of P1 billion is expected to be allotted for the reactivation of the CAFGU. Lawmakers said 35,000 CAFGU members will cost taxpayers P756 million in salaries alone each year. That money can be put to better use by the poorly equipped, cash-strapped Armed Forces of the Philippines. If the government wants to enlist the help of civilians in fighting insurgents, it can go directly to the people. Part of any strategy to contain an insurgency is to win hearts and minds, thus eroding the rebels' mass support. But the country's experiences with the CHDF and CAFGU have shown that these abusive paramilitary units alienated the populace, unwittingly turning communities into fertile grounds for rebel recruitment. 

Will a reactivated CAFGU be any different from its predecessors? The government does not have a good track record of keeping its own attack dogs under control. Before reactivating the CAFGU, the government must consider whether it will end up fighting a monster of its own making.