Military self-reliance

The rising tension over the recent incursions in areas considered as Philippine territory – the latest of which is in Ayungin Shoal with a Chinese military frigate spotted – heightens the debate once again about our country’s military and defense capability. While President Aquino’s resounding declaration that “what is ours is ours” and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin’s courageous statement that our troops will defend our territory “up to the last soldier standing” strike a proud chord with many Filipinos, there is that lingering question about our capability to defend ourselves from external threats, exacerbated by the perception that we have one of the weakest armed forces in Southeast Asia.

While it may be true that we can rely on mutual defense pacts with allies like the United States should push come to shove, at the end of the day, we must and should not be totally dependent on the US. After all, they, too, have their own budgetary problems, and it can happen that their objectives might not be in confluence with what would be most advantageous for us. Which is why the move to revive the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) program by the Department of National Defense as part of our military’s capability upgrade program is more necessary than ever. After all, if we really want to establish a minimum credible defense posture, we must first show that we can be self-reliant as far as equipping our military is concerned.

Not many know that as far back as the early 1970s, the Philippines already initiated the SRDP program to develop our domestic defense industry that, in the long run, would be able to provide support to the AFP in terms of weapons, platforms and equipment. Those supportive of the SRDP also say that an indigenous defense industry would not only cut costs but also provide much needed employment.

The program achieved a modicum of success in its early years but lost track along the way due to several impediments including budget constraints. In a policy guidance memo issued during the time of Gen. Hermogenes Esperon in 2006, the AFP noted the need for the SRDP to be revitalized but the earlier successes (local production of the M-1 rifle, the mini cruiser and tactical communications requirements) were not sustained because of “failed strategies, lack of focus, mismanagement…  the SRDP Program… lost pre-eminence and bearing as a vital component in the development of the local defense industry.”

Indeed, out of the 15 or so defense companies involved earlier in supplying military hardware, only a handful are reliable – like Arms Corporation of the Philippines (Armscor) – which industrialist Don Celso Tuason bought from its American owners and turned into a totally Filipino-owned enterprise 71 years ago. At the recent signing of a memorandum of agreement between Armscor and the Armed Forces (wherein the local manufacturer would provide discounts on firearms to retired and active military personnel), AFP chief Gen. Emmanuel Bautista recognized Armscor’s support, saying the AFP’s ability to protect the people and the state depends on the quality of equipment, acknowledging the savings in buying locally made firearms of excellent quality.

Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Francis Chang pointed out in his paper, “Transforming the Philippines’ Defense Architecture,” that the AFP was among the best-equipped in Southeast Asia during the early 1960s owing to transfers of surplus American weaponry. However, the Philippines became overly reliant on its mutual defense treaty with the US to guarantee its external defense. The dependence on military assistance and logistical support by the US bases also hindered the Philippines from investing sufficient resources on its own infrastructure.

Obviously, the strategic landscape has since shifted, with the recent territorial disputes highlighting the need for enhanced external defense capabilities.  It would take a lot of resources to equip our military in a manner that would enable them to adequately protect our sovereignty and maritime claims – something the President is keenly aware of when he allocated P75 billion for the extension of the modernization program to 15 more years last December. Unfortunately, the first modernization program from 1996 to December 2011 fell short, without any significant progress mainly because of funding delays.

Funding was a major reason for the creation of the Bases Conversion Development Authority that would oversee the sale or disposition of military camps. Perceptions continue however that the money was never fully remitted, with amounts turned over for the modernization program (P56.65 billion from 1993 to December 2012) not sufficient (P23.43 billion).

The proposed sale of Camp Aguinaldo (and Camp Crame) may be opportune – that is, if government could go around the “no sale” clause for the lands donated by the Ortigases. Leasing the Navy headquarters is also being mulled, along with the sale of assets in Fort Magsaysay, Camp Peralta and other camps in Bukidnon, Tarlac and Zambales to generate more resources. Insiders say the strategic relocation of Camp Aguinaldo away from the heart of the metropolis would take away the threat of terrorist extremists from civilians.

The central issue for the Philippines is how to exert enough air-sea control in the South China Sea and develop a strategy built around new technologies for lower maintenance costs. A less costly alternative for external defense can be unmanned aerial vehicles or remotely controlled drones that eliminate risks for flight personnel. In this day and age, technology and modern warfare plus land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (aided by sufficient jungle cover) could help repel enemy firepower, Chang posits.

Clearly, military self-reliance is an absolute priority for the Philippines. If we don’t do it now, we may soon find ourselves treading the road to perdition.

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